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“What are the roots that clutch, what branches grow
Out of this stony rubbish? Son of man,
You cannot say, or guess, for you know only
A heap of broken images, where the sun beats,
And the dead tree gives no shelter, the cricket no relief,
And the dry stone no sound of water. Only
There is shadow under this red rock,
(Come in under the shadow of this red rock),
And I will show you something different from either
Your shadow at morning striding behind you
Or your shadow at evening rising to meet you;
I will show you fear in a handful of dust.”
T.S. Eliot
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Abstract
Escola Te`cnica Superior d’Enginyeria
Departament d’Enginyeria Informa`tica i Matema`tiques
Doctor of Philosophy
by David Pa`mies-Estrems
Every day, more than five billion people generate some kind of data over the
Internet. As a tool for accessing that information, we need to use search services,
either in the form of Web Search Engines or through Personal Assistants. On each
interaction with them, our record of actions via logs, is used to offer a more useful
experience. For companies, logs are also very valuable since they offer a way to
monetize the service.
Monetization is achieved by selling data to third parties, however query logs could
potentially expose sensitive user information: identifiers, sensitive data from users
(such as diseases, sexual tendencies, religious beliefs) or be used for what is called
”life-logging”: a continuous record of one’s daily activities. Current regulations
oblige companies to protect this personal information. Protection systems for
closed data sets have previously been proposed, most of them working with atomic
files or structured data. Unfortunately, those systems do not fit when used in the
growing real-time unstructured data environment posed by Internet services.
This thesis aims to design techniques to protect the user’s sensitive information in a
non-structured real-time streaming environment, guaranteeing a trade-off between
data utility and protection. In this regard, three proposals have been made in effi-
cient log protection. The first is a new method to anonymize query logs, based on
probabilistic k-anonymity and some de-anonymization tools to determine possible
data leaks.
A second method has been improved in terms of a configurable trade-off between
privacy and usability, achieving a great improvement in terms of data utility.
Our final contribution concerns Internet-based Personal Assistants. The infor-
mation generated by these devices is likely to be considered life-logging, and it
can increase the user’s privacy risks. The proposal is a protection scheme that
combines log anonymization and sanitizable signatures.
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Outline of the Thesis
This thesis is organized in 6 chapters.
Chapter 1 states the thesis’ aims and objectives. It also outlines the direction
taken in our research, and introduces the results contained in the remainder of the
thesis.
Chapter 2 summarizes the most relevant and up to date research conducted in
this field. It briefly explains the concepts of privacy and anonymization, study-
ing in detail the main techniques applied in fixed-length and data-stream input
treatment.
Chapter 3 proposes a new method to anonymize query logs based on k-anonymity.
It also proposes some de-anonymization tools to determine possible privacy prob-
lems, in case an attacker gains access to the anonymized query logs. This approach
tries to preserve the original user interests, but spreads possible semi-identifier in-
formation over many users, to prevent linkage attacks.
Chapter 4 presents an alternative method to anonymize query logs, with the goal
of obtaining the same or better level of privacy, in addition to a customizable data
utility through the use of parameterizable levels of categorization. It also devises
formal and experimental proofs that ensure its feasibility in terms of privacy,
utility, and scalability achievement.
Chapter 5 highlights the threats generated by the use of Internet-based personal
assistants. Although the interaction with those devices is conducted by voice in
a local environment, the generated logs are often collected and stored on remote
servers, which can lead to serious privacy risks. To mitigate privacy threats,
this chapter proposes a protection scheme that combines log anonymization and
sanitizable signatures.
Chapter 6 presents the main conclusions of the thesis, including achieved goals,
limitations of the current approach and avenues for future research.
xxi
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A la meva mare.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter is divided into three main sections. In section 1.1 we briefly introduce
the conjunction of the facts that motivates the direction taken in our research. In
section 1.2 we give a general description of each of the contributions of this thesis.
Finally, section 1.3 lists the publications emanating from this thesis.
1.1 Motivation
The whole data created, captured, or replicated, is called the Global Datasphere.
IDC predicts that the Global Datasphere will grow at an annual rate of 61%, from
33 Zettabytes (ZB) in 2018 to 175 ZB by 2025. In terms of population, more than
five billion people generate some kind of data every day. By 2025, that number
will be six billion, or 75% of the world’s population, and each connected person
will have at least 5 000 daily digital interactions, in front of the current 800 [1].
Global Datasphere is composed of very varied data sources, such as surveillance
cameras, medical data, digital TV/radio, video games, mobile phones, VoIP, PCs,
servers’ logs, and embedded systems (in automobiles, vending machines, etc.).
If we focus only on the Web, individuals usually interact with what is known as a
Web Search Engine (WSE), a system that is designed to search the World Wide
1
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2 Introduction
Web in a systematic way for particular information specified in a textual search
query [2]. These queries contain certain keywords related to the topics they are
looking for. The WSE, then retrieves and presents an accurate list of responses
that tackle those topics. Generally, people use these services mainly for one of
these three reasons: information research, shopping, or entertainment.
Popularity of these tools remain very high [3] since only sending a basic query
allows people to find, with a minimal response time, what they are looking for.
Therefore, it can be assumed that services such as the ones offered by Google or
Bing will continue to be essential in the coming years.
Apart from the information retrieval process needed to fulfill the user’s query, the
service also starts a data gathering process that stores the submitted query (i.e.,
the keywords) and some metadata e.g. date of the query, some identifiers of the
query issuer (user id), which specific search result was selected by the issuer (if
applies), and other user related information [4, 5]. Additionally, queries made
on most modern devices often send the user location and the local time as two
additional parameters when it comes to find the most convenient information in
each situation. Therefore, user, location, and local time are also registered in the
company servers. This information is usually registered in the form of a log, and
all the logs are usually stored in a file or database, which contains all the previously
recorded logs, and is generally referred to as query logs [6]. Over time, the query
logs gathering process, produces a huge data repository of information about our
everyday lives, which can be called lifelogging [7].
In the past, people have only used Web Search Engines as the main gateway to the
Internet, but as time goes by, we can find more alternatives. The new proposals
are trying to reduce the barriers to access information even more and to make
it accessible to everyone, anytime. As a consequence of these innovations, today
we can find a multitude of technological tools that have been developed precisely
for this reason: smartphones, smartgateways, smartwatches and activity bands.
As a whole, we will refer to these devices as Personal Assistants. For reasons of
economies of scale, the development of this type of device is only available to a
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1.1. Motivation 3
few technological organizations [8, 9]. These tools allow the lifelogging process to
be even more exhaustive.
Furthermore, the data about individuals, groups, and periods of time could be
combined into bigger groups over longer periods of time; what has been recently
designated as Big Data.
Once the query logs are generated, they are processed and analyzed to build users’
profiles [10] which could be used to improve their services in several ways. In the
literature, a user profile is generally considered a set of well-defined categories of
interests (e.g. science, health, society, sports, etc.) with a certain weight assigned
to each one according to the evidence generated by the corresponding user and
how they have been classified under each category [11]. When focusing on search
services, search queries are the evidence, and the amount of queries from each user
classified under each category reflects the related weight.
Users’ profiles could be helpful in improving the service offered in the following
ways:
• Personalization. Query terms can have multiple meanings; therefore, iden-
tifying the sense required by the user represents a challenge. In order to
better fulfill their needs, more relevant results should be placed in the first
position of the returned results. By analyzing the queries submitted by users
in the past, the service providers can gain knowledge about their preferences,
and this knowledge can be used to contextualize and disambiguate terms in
the future [12, 13]. This way, if a user searches for “Mercury” and her pro-
file indicates that she is interested in “Astronomy”, the WSE can prioritize
relevant results (e.g., URLs) that correspond to the planet Mercury in the
initial positions of search results, instead of the chemical element.
• Usability: By knowing the frequencies of most formulated queries and
most selected results, online services are able to improve the ranking algo-
rithms [14]. This can also be used to suggest alternative queries [15]. Such
suggestions can show how to correct mistakes when typing, add specificity
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to the initial query, or provide similar queries with more results after retriev-
ing poor results for the original query submission [16]. Continuing with the
example of the term “Mercury”, if a user inputs just this term, the service
could suggest more specific alternative queries, such as “Mercury - Planet”,
“Mercury - Element”, “mercury poisoning”, and “mercury marine”, among
others. These alternative keywords are expected to retrieve more accurate
results for the user.
However, query logs can also be exploited for other purposes because they reveal
powerful insights about customer intent-to-purchase and other factors [17]. This
new exploitation can be conducted by the service provider itself or by a third
party, for the following purposes:
• Marketing: While characterizing general user profiles, user behavior, and
user search habits, it is possible to improve keyword advertising campaigns
and extract market tendencies among others. For example, the user can be
characterized by their query logs (gender, age, income, education, etc.) and
afterwards verify if the advertisements have had an impact on the intended
audience (interests and behaviour) [18, 19]. Besides this, it is possible to
extract market tendencies [20]. More concretely, search analytics is one of
the cornerstones of so-called Search Engine Marketing and it is in charge
of using search data to investigate particular interactions among searchers,
the search engine, or content during searching episodes [21]. For example,
Google Trends1 is a service that exploits this kind of data. In particular,
Google Trends shows how often a particular term is searched according to
the total search volume across various regions of the world.
• Research: As stated in [22], query logs contain information that would
never be available to researchers using conventional data collection tech-
niques. For example, a medical researcher might discover that people with
1Google Trends. https://www.google.com/trends/
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asthma tend to wear wool or live in areas with coal power plants; a soci-
ologist may study how ideas spread from one person to an entire commu-
nity, or may investigate the differences between the interests that individuals
claim to have during face-to-face interviews and the real interests that their
search queries reveal [23]; a political scientist might learn about democracy
by studying the evolution of political searches by users in a developing coun-
try. Query logs also enable researchers to ask questions that would normally
require going backward in time. For example, a medical researcher might
study people diagnosed with diabetes today to find out what their primary
symptoms were six months ago. Asking them directly, once they learn they
have diabetes, may result in subjective bias [22]. Last but not least, a
computer scientist may study and analyze new Information Retrieval (IR)
algorithms via a common benchmark query log [24]. It may also be used to
learn about users information needs and query formulation approaches [20]
and revolve around the use of language in queries [25], among other research
topics [26–30].
Turning this data into knowledge is a key interest for many companies, since
the extraction of valuable information is what enables those companies to obtain
economic benefits. This process is known as data monetization [31]. A classic
example of data monetization can be found in the supermarket group Tesco [32],
which uses a data ecosystem to monetize data from its loyalty program, the Tesco
ClubCard. In return for opting in to ClubCard, customers receive personalized
offers. The same knowledge could be extracted from the queries against Internet
services, making that information valuable. In addition to those benefits, building
and exploiting query logs may lead to serious privacy problems as well, since this
process enables these organizations to compile a lot of data about individuals.
Each query logged contains a user identifier, a text about what the user is looking
for, the time when it was done, the results selected by the user, and in some cases,
the user’s location.
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The keywords of each query and the related metadata may provide sensitive infor-
mation from the user such as behaviors, habits, interests, religious views, sexual
orientation, etc. to anyone who has access to the logs and therefore to third parties.
Even more, some query keywords may contain identifiers and quasi-identifiers [33],
which may allow to link queries with real people. This is specially feasible, given
current tendencies such as vanity search and egosurfing [34], in which people look
for their own names over the Internet.
Someone might think that if it is too dangerous to save these logs, a possible
solution would be to not store any of them. However, as we have seen, the service
they offer is essential in order to allow people to find information on the Internet,
and the economic viability of the companies that offer this service is closely linked
to the data monetization process. Therefore, they will continue keeping the data.
The current practice was recently put in the spotlight by the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission when it published a report about data collection and use practices of
the most relevant Data Brokers [35]. The widespread development of technologies
such as Data Mining and Artificial Intelligence over Big Data, make the task of
extracting information, knowledge, or relevant relationships easier every day [36].
This can lead to very serious privacy risks of personal data disclosure, as this data
can be exploded not only in isolation, but also as a combination of information
generated between several sources.
Anyone who uses these services is constantly disclosing, in a direct or indirect
way, personal data to the organization which provides the service. Using Personal
Assistants, the situation is even more accentuated, since the user is not in front
of a computer. Users tend to establish more relaxed relationships with the device,
sometimes without even knowing if it is working or sending information to another
site, and mostly seeing it as a friend or an extension of its person.
Therefore there is a strong need to protect sensible users’ data, while allowing the
resulting data to remain useful for companies that offer the service.
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To protect the privacy of individuals, several measures were established by law-
makers, from the USA Privacy Act of 1974 [37], until the recent General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), adopted by the European Union in 2016 [38].
Specifically in this last case, all entities that perform personal data processing
related to European citizens, must be able to demonstrate at any time that they
are complying with the regulations established by the GDPR.
Although query logs could be protected prior to their publication, there is no ab-
solute guarantee of anonymity. To protect the user’s identity and sensitive data,
there exist some techniques that are able to eliminate direct user identifiers. How-
ever, a specialized type of attack, called Record Linkage attack, allows the linking
of different user records, which contain seemingly harmless information, but when
all the data can be related to, it can end up revealing sensitive information from
the users [19, 39]. As an example, there is one well-known case, the AOL Research
scandal, in which around 36 million queries performed by AOL’s customers were
publicly disclosed. Although records were previously de-identified, it was possible
to identify some users from the disclosed query logs and other sensitive information
was exposed [40]. The case ended up with an important damage to AOL users’ pri-
vacy and to AOL itself, with several class action law suits and complaints against
the company [41–43].
In addition, these data protection schemes have traditionally been constructed
from a static point of view; that is, a closed data set taken and protected in
isolation. These techniques may be improved to reach a good level of protection,
but our context seems different. Interactions made by a user and therefore their
history, increase frequently. This could be seen in global terms as a real-time data
stream.
As indicated by [1], real-time data currently represents 15% of the Global Datas-
phere, but predictions point that nearly 30% will be real-time by 2025. Enterprises
looking to provide superior customer experience and grow share must have data
infrastructures that can meet this growth in real-time data. Therefore, what we
need to propose is a streaming protection scheme.
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More specifically, we propose using a server-side software capable of processing
queries in real time and building anonymized query logs that still retain enough
data utility to allow its monetization. As a result, search service providers may
then offer the protected query logs to external organizations for data monetization
purposes while keeping the real query logs in a safe place; otherwise, search service
providers may also decide to only keep protected logs, getting in turn a lower risk
of information disclosure in case of a direct attack.
At the same time, search service providers may generate profiles that contain simi-
lar queries from other users. Each profile is not the user’s profile, but it contains
the same interests, with the benefit that quasi-identifiers do not correspond with
this user.
We also want to study an additional case, that may remain vulnerable: lifelogging
data streams generated by Internet-based personal devices like Google Home and
Amazon Echo [5, 44]. The issue generated by such devices, related to other data
information actors in terms of EU data protection directives, is an interesting topic
which may need some customised solution, therefore we will scrutinize that case
in detail.
To sum up, this thesis proposal takes into account the role of the organizations and
their needs to monetize the user’s data, and aims to generate streams of query logs
in real time that preserve an adequate level of data utility for the monetization
process, but at the same time with a limited privacy disclosure risk.
1.2 Research Contributions
In this section we briefly describe each of the contributions of this thesis. In
the order of appearance in the remainder of the text, the research contributions
are: Working at the Web Search Engine Side to Generate Privacy-preserving User
Profiles, A Real-Time Query Log Protection Method for Web Search Engines,
Lifelogging Protection Scheme for Internet-Based Personal Assistants.
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1.2.1 Working at the Web Search Engine Side to Generate
Privacy-preserving User Profiles
The popularity of Web Search Engines (WSEs) enables them to generate a lot of
data in form of query logs. These files contain all search queries submitted by
users. Economical benefits could be earned by means of selling or releasing those
logs to third parties. Nevertheless, this data potentially expose sensitive user
information. Removing direct identifiers is not sufficient to preserve the privacy of
the users. Some existing privacy-preserving approaches use log batch processing
but, as logs are generated and consumed in a real-time environment, a continuous
anonymization process would be more convenient. In this way, in this paper we
propose: i) a new method to anonymize query logs, based on k-anonymity; and ii)
some de-anonymization tools to determine possible privacy problems, in case that
an attacker gains access to the anonymized query logs. This approach preserves the
original user interests, but spreads possible semi-identifier information over many
users, preventing linkage attacks. To assess its performance, all the proposed
algorithms are implemented and an extensive set of experiments are conducted
using real data.
1.2.2 A Real-Time Query Log Protection Method for Web
Search Engines
Web search engines (e.g., Google, Bing, Qwant, and DuckDuckGo) may process a
myriad of search queries per second. According to Internet Live Stats, Google han-
dles more than two hundred million queries per hour, i.e., about two trillion queries
per year. For monetization purposes, the queries can be stored and complemented
with additional data, referred to as query logs. Together, they can correlate valu-
able information to build accurate user profiles. Before releasing the query logs to
third parties (e.g., for profit purposes), the personal information contained in the
query logs must be properly protected by the web search engines. Current regula-
tions establish strict control, and require from provable anonymization processing
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(e.g., in terms of statistical disclosure) of any personally identifiable information.
In this paper, we tackle this challenge. We propose a real-time anonymization
solution to protect streams of unstructured data at the server side. Our approach
is based on the use of a probabilistic k-anonymity technique. It allows proba-
bilistic processing of personally identifiable attributes contained in the query logs,
with provable privacy properties. Our solution handles limitations of traditional k-
anonymity approaches with respect to unstructured data and real-time processing.
We present the implementation of our solution and report experimental evaluation
results. The evaluation is conducted in terms of privacy, utility, and scalability
achievement. Results validate the feasibility of our proposal.
1.2.3 Lifelogging Protection Scheme for Internet-Based
Personal Assistants
Internet-based personal assistants are promising devices combining voice control
and search technologies to pull out relevant information to domestic users. They
are expected to assist in a smart way to household activities, such as to schedule
meetings, find locations, reporting of cultural events, sending of messages and
a lot more. The information collected by these devices, including personalized
lifelogs about their corresponding users, is likely to be stored by well-established
Internet players related to web search engines and social media. This can lead to
serious privacy risks. The issue of protecting the identity of domestic users and
their sensitive data must be tackled at design time, to promptly mitigate privacy
threats. Towards this end, this paper proposes a protection scheme that jointly
handles the aforementioned issues by combining log anonymization and sanitizable
signatures.
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Chapter 2
State of the Art
Privacy in our society is increasingly critical. Mobile and computing applications
are dramatically increasing the amount of personal data released to service pro-
viders as well as to third parties [48]. This data often includes the location of
individuals, their movement patterns as well as sensor-acquired data that may
reveal individuals’ physical conditions and habits. Privacy solutions must comply
to ethical and legal requirements, and not prevent profitable business models.
The illegitimate use of personal data is becoming a commonplace. We can find
varied examples. In the AOL Research case [49], a detailed search logs by AOL
were released. The release was intentional and intended for research purposes;
however, the public release meant that the entire Internet could see the results
rather than a select number of academics. AOL did not identify any user in the
report, and in fact the logs were previously protected, but personally identifiable
information was present in many of the queries. This allowed to identify some
user and sensible information from the query logs [40]. This case underscores how
much people unintentionally reveal about themselves when they use search engines,
and how risky it can be for companies like AOL, Google and Yahoo to compile
such data. AOL itself, has been sued over its online release of data, accused
of violating the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and of fraudulent and
deceptive business practices, among other claims [42]. The lawsuit seek at least
13
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$5,000 for every person whose search data was exposed. Two AOL employees were
fired and the Chief Technology Officer resigned over the incident.
In fact, other companies are also not exempt from controversy. USA Justice De-
partment request data about user’s search queries to America Online, Yahoo,
Microsoft an Google [43]. That case did not involve information that could be
linked to individuals, but highlights what Internet user can expect for the data
trail they leave online.
In a similar vein we can find other cases concerning privacy, such as NSA PRISM
program revealed by E. Snowden in May 20131, or the recent scandal of Cambridge
Analytica and Facebook, published in April 20182.
Our work is focused on to the use of privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) applied
to the web search paradigm. In this chapter, we summarise most relevant research
conducted in this field and published up to date. The responsibility of applying
PETs relies on two main actors: user and WSE. Notwithstanding, we have chosen
to organize the research in three main groups as shown on Figure 2.1, on the basis
of previous classifications [3, 50, 51]. All the proposals are designed to protect the
user’s privacy in front of WSEs.
The first group, studied in detail in Section 2.1, contains proposals that protect
user’s privacy at the WSE side without the need for user’s participation. They
are asynchronous and transparent to the user. The second group, described in
Section 2.2, includes approaches that protect user’s privacy without any help from
the WSE, i.e., when user do not require any changes at the server side of the WSE.
The third group, in Section 2.3 comprises approaches that require a certain level
of cooperation between the user and the WSE. The latter are not considered as
server-side, since the user actively participate in the process — when WSEs do
not cooperate, it is assumed that the user immediately detect them. In the sequel,
we report related work under all three categories.
1http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-23123964
2http://fortune.com/2018/04/10/facebook-cambridge-analytica-what-happened/
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WSE PETs
SERVER-SIDE
Fixed-length Inputs
Suppression
Generalization
k-anonymity
Differential Privacy
Data-stream Inputs
Rank Swapping
Differential Privacy
k-anonymity
Probabilistic k-anonymity
CLIENT-SIDE
Obfuscation Techniques
Standalone Systems
Distributed Systems
Anonymous Channels
COLLABORATIVE WSE-CLIENT
Private Information Retrieval
Platform for Privacy Preferences
Context-based Retrieval
Figure 2.1: Classification of Web Search Engine Privacy Enhancing Technolo-
gies (PETs)
2.1 Survey on Server Side Proposals
Anonymization of query logs on Server Side has been addressed in the literature
from different approaches. WSEs aim at anonymizing data while minimizing infor-
mation loss, with the goal of commercialize releases of the protected set of query
logs to third-parties. Therefore, our work is focused on this assumption. Anonymi-
zation solutions to reach such a goal can get classified according to anonymizaiton
inputs. Most solutions are either processing fixed-length (e.g., block-based) or
data-stream inputs.
2.1.1 Fixed-length input
Chronologically, the fixed-length input methods were the first to be proposed.
Some statistic and/or semantic methods are applied to the data-set to find the
sensible information and reduce the sensible information disclosure.
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Existing proposals of this type, consider a set of finite and static data structures,
therefore, each set contains all the elements before beginning the treatment. To
make the protection of the whole dataset, the protection is conducted as a two-
step process, first all the dataset elements are analyzed and then a comprehensive
protection can be applied where needed.
The interesting thing about this approach is that some logs may not divulge in-
formation for themselves, but once some logs of the same user are related, the
aggregated data may reveal some additional sensible information about the indi-
vidual. By having all the data available, it allows those methods to process all the
queries and strategically modify or remove queries to reduce the risk of information
disclosure, before publishing any data.
A possible drawback of this approach can be found by anonymizing twice the
same data and obtaining slightly different results. In this case, each additional
anonymization would be releasing additional information about the original data.
Another limitation of these approaches is that they need to complete the data
set, before being able to treat it and release it. These sets can be large and slow
to complete. Therefore, in some scenario where data is needed continuously, this
approach is not feasible. Additionally, if periodic blocks of information are freely
released, these approaches may also reveal certain temporary information related
to the user.
Below are explained the main approaches which belong to the fixed-length input
category, divided in four main subcategories, depending of the applied technique:
Suppression, Generalization, k-anonymity and Differential Privacy.
2.1.1.1 Suppression
Considering that the data to be treated is in fixed-length input, a possible first
approach to achieve query log anonymization is to review all that data and elimi-
nate or hash those elements which, in isolation or combination, may reveal sensible
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information. The analysis of the dataset assumes either statistic or semantic meth-
ods, to identify which elements require suppression.
Examples of suppression under the context of query logs anonymization exist in
the related literature [16]. In particular, they pose seven proposals: Log deletion,
hashing queries, identifier deletion, hashing identifiers, scrubbing query content,
deleting infrequent queries and shortening sessions. Those include some basic
statistic and semantic methods, concluding that search industry, academia, con-
sumers, and regulators all play important roles in determining how to strike the
balance between utility and privacy.
More concretely, methodologies based on shortening sessions, simply remove old
query sets assuming that query logs will not be large enough to enable identity
disclosure. However, this assumption does not take into account the existence
of highly identifying queries. This can be seen on the three-month of query logs
published by AOL [40], which does not record the user’s AOL screen names, hop-
ping it would benefit academic researchers. Shortly after the publication, some
user’s names and addresses were identified among the logs. Those logs underscore
how much people unintentionally reveal about themselves when they use search
engines, and how risky it can be for companies like AOL, Google and Yahoo to
compile such data.
Another approach is to remove sets of queries, instead of only the old ones [52],
also assuming that the size of the user’s logs will not be large enough to allow
diffusion of the user identity. In this case, the protection of privacy against highly
identifying queries also remain compromised.
A more appropriate approach [26] proposes a solution, based on a threshold cryp-
tography system, that only eliminates highly identifying queries, in real time,
without preserving history. They assume that those queries are more likely to re-
fer to identifying or quasi-identifying information. It uses a scheme for encrypting
unique queries with a hash that can be decrypted given sufficient examples of the
query being used by multiple users. This approach is not free of issues. If an
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attacker knows or forces a user to make a query, the attacker can effectively mark
all that session.
Also, targeting at unique queries seems to be a overly aggressive technique, as the
elimination of a significant number of non-identifying queries becomes a complex
and error-prone task. However, this is difficult to avoid due to the fact that the
vast majority of queries appear only a limited number of times, as it can be seen
at the query traffic analysis conducted on [27]. This analysis was conducted on
an hourly basis by matching it against list of queries that have been topically pre-
categorized by human editors. In any case, it can be quite challenging to select
the proper deletion threshold using this approach.
A report illustrates how top search engines deal with the retention of user’s search
information [53], also based in suppression methods. In this case, some WSE give
to the user the ability to opt out of having WSE retain their search information,
including IP address, ID and search query, or delete that information after a certain
time. Some apply a personal information filter to remove unique identifiers, names,
physical addresses, phone numbers, social security numbers, bank accounts or any
other identification data related to the user. It is important to note, that when a
user chooses to delete information from their personal search history, it will still
remain on the search engine’s servers until the minimum retention time defined in
their policy, which in some cases is declared to be up to 18 months. Therefore,
these data are still exposed to a data breach, even after the user’s request for
removal.
Nevertheless, the AOL incident reveals the limitations of this approach [41–43].
AOL apologized for its massive search data disclosure, but also declared that
the personally identifiable data was removed from these accounts. The existence
of quasi-identifiers in the AOL dataset, and the complexity of identifying their
combinations, were proven enough to re-identify AOL users via traditional log
correlation techniques [40]. Many AOL users could be identified, as vanity searches
for name or social network profile, or searches related to city and neighborhood,
appear in the search history and it may provide clues to user’s identity. Therefore,
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this shows us that combining the remaining no-identifying data may be enough to
disclose the identities of the individuals in some cases.
More elaborated approaches in this field [20] show how queries, clicks and counts
can be published in a perturbed manner that preserves privacy. The conducted
perturbation focuses on removing those queries that end up with the user clicking
common URLs, considering that those queries may be dependent, therefore, high-
lighting quasi-identifiers. In addition, they generate keywords from the perturbed
data and show that those resemble the ones generated from the original data.
However this approach could be deceived, forcing the search engine to publish
private data. The authors also state that this approach could be improved using
generalization techniques.
Another possibility is the representation of query logs using graph theory [19]. The
graph representation is used for query log privacy preservation analysis, defining
a heuristic for log anonymization through graph disconnection. In this approach,
nodes are seen as user queries. A query is connected to other user queries whenever
the intersection of their clicked URLs sets is non empty. Then the system sorts
the nodes (queries) on their total number of queries divided by clicked documents.
The anonymization process is done by disconnecting the graph. It can be achieved
by iteratively suppressing infrequent queries, the queries that return less than k
documents. Those queries are most likely to point to individuals (i.e., queries with
partial or full target URLs) and therefore are considered more vulnerable, so it is
intuitively desirable to suppress them. This approach could benefit from grouping
infrequent queries, to obtain higher frequency terms.
As we have seen in the last suppression proposals, a further study on general-
ization techniques seems that could help to improve anonymization results. In
this context, transforming infrequent queries into frequent ones, but other impli-
cations may arise, so we will continue studying some proposals that point on that
direction.
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2.1.1.2 Generalization
Another approach used to provide anonymity is based on the use of generalization
between domains relationships and between values that the associated attributes
can assume. In general, this approach seeks to make users who performed similar
queries, indistinguishable among them.
The concept of minimal generalization was introduced in [54], where they illus-
trate how k-anonymity can be provided by using generalization and suppression
techniques. They introduce the concept of minimal generalization, which captures
the property of the release process not to distort the data more than needed to
achieve k-anonymity. However, some aspects remain unresolved, the definition of
quasi-identifiers and of an appropriate size of k must be addressed. Determining
the quality and utility in other settings must be further researched. They also need
further investigation of an efficient algorithm, considering specific queries, multiple
releases over time, and data updating, which may allow inference attacks.
Due to the dimensionality and unbounded nature of query logs, some authors have
proposed a top-down, approaches, using lexical and semantic databases to conduct
general-purpose generalizations. As it can be seen in a partition-based approach
to anonymize set-valued data that scales linearly with the input size and scores
well on an information-loss data quality metric [55]. The proposed algorithms in
this case are efficient enough to be applied to non-trivial real-world data, but the
information loss results are not as satisfactory in search query logs as when it was
applied to other kinds of more structured data.
Another pioneer work on the field of semantic generalization [56], do not distin-
guish data as sensitive and non-sensitive, but consider all the data as potential
sensitive data. The idea is to transform groups of input queries to common con-
ceptual abstractions (e.g. sailing and swimming to water sports), in order to
make users who performed similar queries indistinguishable. The main proposed
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO LIFELOGGING PROTECTION IN STREAMING ENVIRONMENTS 
David Pàmies Estrems 
 
2.1. Survey on Server Side Proposals 21
algorithm finds the optimal solution, however, at a high cost which makes it in-
applicable for realistic problems. Then, they propose two greedy heuristics, which
find a solution close to the optimal at a minor cost.
For proposals that are based on concept generalization, is very useful the use of
knowledge bases, such as WordNet [57]. WordNet is an online lexical database
designed for use under program control. English nouns, verbs, adjectives, and ad-
verbs are organized into sets of synonyms, each representing a lexicalized concept.
Semantic relations link the synonym sets to determine word definitions.
The main limitations of a generalization approach is that a query could be mean-
ingless in a generic dictionary, but it could be identified as dangerous, according to
a more specific dictionary. Therefore, they may need a specific dictionary for each
language or sub-domain used on the original data set, which makes the creation
and maintenance of these dictionaries an important task for the proper functioning
of the proposals, specially in a broad contexts such as query logs. It appears that
anonymizing data containing large sets from large domains appears to be a very
difficult problem that may require techniques beyond generalization.
2.1.1.3 k-anonymity
To overcome previous limitations, the concept of k-anonymity was proposed [54]
which minimizes the risk of record-linkage. They also illustrate how k-anonymity
can be provided by using a combination of generalization and suppression tech-
niques.
Conducting a k-anonymity process at the server-side, before releasing the query
logs, leads to the release of k-anonymized data-sets. Those data-sets will satisfy
the k-anonymity privacy property whenever user data contained within the query
logs cannot be distinguished from at least k − 1 other users — whose data also
appear in the release. In other words, no individual can be re-identified with
probability exceeding 1
k
through linking attacks alone.
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In a more recent paper [58], the author describes how the techniques developed for
protecting data have evolved in the years. It starts by providing an overview of the
first privacy definitions (k-anonymity, l-diversity, t-closeness and their extensions)
aimed at ensuring proper data protection against identity and attribute disclosures.
It also shows the impact on privacy when considering multiple releases of the same
data or dynamic data collections, fine-grained privacy definitions, generic privacy
constraints, and the external knowledge that a potential adversary may exploit
for inferring sensitive information. Those are the main shortcomings of the k-
anonymity based approach. They also briefly present the concept of differential
privacy, as an alternative privacy definition, which we will study in detail later.
Next step in the evolution of proposals were provable anonymization methods
based on Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC ) techniques [33]. Those methods,
must be conducted to guarantee bounded disclosure risks [59]. Their goal is to
transform query records into anonymous logs while retaining the maximum level
of information and reducing the amount of query deletion.
We can see an example in [60], where an anonymization model is presented. This
model extends the notion of k-anonymity and provides metrics for user similarity
and query similarity. The inherent utility and privacy trade-off was analyzed, and
experimental results show that with this model it is possible to achieve high user
similarity in the anonymized data quite efficiently. However the suitability of the
method remains untested in different important applications, such as query log
mining.
Also, [61] introduces an approach to anonymize search query logs by means of
microaggregation to protect the user privacy. In this approach there is also an
attempt to provide a high degree of privacy ensuring k-anonymity on the data,
without having to completely eliminate any record, to allow the search logs to
retain its usefulness. However disclosure risk and information lose of the data re-
mains untested. Besides, a better aggregation of query terms by means of semantic
generalization could be obtained using the WordNet lexical database.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO LIFELOGGING PROTECTION IN STREAMING ENVIRONMENTS 
David Pàmies Estrems 
 
2.1. Survey on Server Side Proposals 23
Another subset of approaches try to use logs of similar queries to group users,
and later their queries are rewritten by a prototype query, so that they become
indistinguishable. We proceed to study those approaches in more detail below.
In [62] a new scheme that generates distorted user queries from a semantic point
of view in order to preserve the usefulness of user profiles is presented. The new
queries, created by analyzing those already performed by the user, introduce a
configurable degree of information distortion proportional to the desired level of
privacy. The most CPU-demanding task in this scheme is the retrieval of concepts
from the background ontologies. Due to the lower-efficient access method and
the larger size of the ODP repository, the analysis of a query may take up to an
average of 1 500 ms, and this is the main disadvantage of the proposal.
An improved method based on micro-aggregation [63], uses search results to in-
crease the semantic interpretation of the query logs, providing more data reliability
than previous methods. The improvement is solely based on the new similarity
function, but as they state, using a clustering heuristic such as Maximum Distance
Average Vector (MDAV ) can improve the achieved results in those techniques.
The usage of MDAV was introduced in [64], which based on semantic micro-
aggregation, enable the publication of privacy-preserved query logs. Query logs are
clustered into groups, using ODP categories, of size k (data partition) and replaced
by the cluster centroid (data anonymization) using MDAV, which establish the
base of their query anonymization proposal. Thanks to that, the semantics and
distribution of original queries was preserved, while disclosure risk was kept at a
reasonable level.
Another approximation using MDAV was presented on [65], that defines an ano-
nymization method for set-valued data based on semantic micro-aggregation by
extracting their conceptualisations from an ontology. This enables to aggregate
set-valued data from a semantic perspective by means of an adaptation of the
MDAV algorithm. In this case, the synthetic records that semantically match the
cluster centroids are generated by randomly picking values from different records
of the input data set.
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Also using micro-aggregation, we found another approach for query logs anony-
mization [66]. In this case the original queries were also replaced by the centroid.
The novelty of this approach is that the other parts of the log are aggregated by
using the arithmetic mean for the rank and the timestamp, and generalizing the
user selected URL to the right-most common part, i.e. the sub-domain. This
proposal seeks to achieve full k-anonymity of the user in the query log.
Up to this point we have seen that users and queries are conserved, although
queries are transformed to reduce the risk of disclosure. However, alternative ap-
proaches have been proposed to generate fake messages, and mix them together
with the legitimate ones to make more difficult to relate sensitive information. As
an example, [67] presents a scheme that obfuscates the real user’s profile, gener-
ating fake messages together with legitimate ones. The fake messages use terms
semantically correlated with user posts to distort and, hence, hide the real profile.
This scheme effectively distorts user profiles, producing uniform (i.e. balanced)
profiles that hardly characterize any user. This scheme could face limitations
against ad hoc profiling methods specially designed to detect fake messages. So
custom systems that recognize and omit fake messages could be developed us-
ing trained classifiers or defining specific detection rules, so the protection of this
proposal could be defused.
As many infrequent queries can be seen as refinements of a more general frequent
query, a different approach [68] tries to mask the infrequent queries using the gen-
eral ones. It presents a semantic approach applied in three steps: query concept
mining, automatic query expansion, and affinity assessment of expanded queries.
Doing so, the approach is able to mask identifying queries while retaining a sub-
stantial amount of highly infrequent queries, achieving levels of privacy comparable
to those of plain k-anonymity while at the same time reducing the data losses.
Statistical disclosure control, so far, seems the more suitable approach for our
purpose. It could be accomplished trough different anonymization techniques and
statistical criteria, being k-anonymity the most widely accepted technique. Event
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though k-anonymity seems very promising, all the approaches based on the gen-
eralisation of original values suffer from a high information loss, derived from the
reduced granularity of the output values. Moreover, its application is limited solely
to finite sets of data. As in the context we are studying the data is generated con-
tinuously, data utility will be one of our concerns. We need to look further for a
more appropriate approach for our case.
2.1.1.4 Differential privacy
Initially described as a solution, which, intuitively, captures the increased risk
to one’s privacy incurred by participating in a given dataset [69]. However, an
auxiliary information generator with information about someone not even in the
database can cause a privacy breach to this person. In order to sidestep this issue
they part from absolute guarantees about disclosures to relative ones: any given
disclosure will be, within a small multiplicative factor. As a consequence, there
is a nominally increased risk to the individual in participating, and only nominal
gain to be had by concealing or misrepresenting one’s data.
Using this idea, interactive scenarios of the same approach do also exist [70], to
provide safe interactive access to search logs, instead of releasing them. In those
methods, who accesses the data is just allowed to make some queries, accessing
partial information of the data-set. However, if these queries are intelligently
conducted, they may end up revealing information from the original user. For
that reason, semantic policies are used to infer the higher levels of information
that can be mined from a data-set based on the fields accessed by a researcher.
The accessed fields are then used to build research profile(s) that guide the amount
of privacy to be enforced using differential privacy, and if the fixed privacy limit is
surpassed, then the system stops responding, which is the first limitation of this
proposal. A second limitation is that the raw search logs cannot be given or sold
to a third party, so they are limited to conduct research over the logs using the
provided tool.
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Since the protected output may still preserve some statistics (e.g., query sugges-
tions, spelling corrections and query classification), extended proposals [20] aim
at similar systems, but returning only some statistics to further limiting the risk
of information disclosure.
Authors in [71] propose a technique which seeks to greedily select representative
samples in query logs with high utility and provide privacy guarantee by prior
estimation of n-word phrase utility. In the estimation, they utilize click entropy
to measure the click distribution of the same query. In this way, samples with
high utility are selected to become the representative records in each cluster with-
out sacrificing privacy while reducing redundancy, which can help to achieve the
objective of leaking less privacy and releasing more useful information.
We can also find other proposals using differential privacy on query logs to guar-
antee high levels of privacy [72]. In this case, they also provide a proof for why the
user IDs in each individual search records can not be released in order to achieve
such differential privacy. They also illustrate the privacy-utility trade-off in query
log releasing process. Regarding to this, the proposal was too strict to use in a
WSE environment and some settings need to be relaxed to maintain data utility
of the released query log. A similar framework [73] was introduced to anonymize
query logs by differential privacy. The framework is empirically evaluated and ex-
periments show that the Web search algorithms using the anonymized logs do not
perform significantly different from those using the original logs. They also sug-
gest using more relaxed settings in a WSE context, to maintain high data utility.
Both cases pose the addition of Laplacian noise to the logs, to preserve privacy.
However, the noise added is highly related with the loss of data utility. The more
noise is added, the more data utility gets reduced.
In general, differential privacy methods, still use some kind of data perturbation.
Therefore all of them suffer from unmitigated risks, such as leakage in queries and
URL, as well as noise addition.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO LIFELOGGING PROTECTION IN STREAMING ENVIRONMENTS 
David Pàmies Estrems 
 
2.1. Survey on Server Side Proposals 27
2.1.2 Data-stream input
Data-streams can be considered as one of the main sources of what is called big
data. Therefore, it has been the target of some research in recent years. However
few proposals has been directly applied to WSE query logs viewed as a data-
stream, but this kind of approach could be relevant for our research because it
allows to treat data partially. Considering that data-stream usually contains huge
volumes of data and could be virtually infinite, techniques that do not need the
full data set are definitely deserve to be considered.
The storage, querying and mining of such data is a resource intensive task, and
maintaining the privacy is challenging. Previous reviewed statistical disclosure
control (SDC ) or privacy-preserving techniques, usually cannot be applied directly
in a data-stream environment.
We need schemes that consider data as an unlimited stream and that are able
to process information as soon as it is generated. A preliminary review of some
proposals in this regard [74] points that this kind of systems do not need to store
all the data to start dealing with it, and also are able to generate data output
with a minimum delay. It also stands out that due to the huge amounts of data,
it is important to design efficient techniques that can have only one look or less
over the incoming data-stream, and this should be accompanied with acceptable
result accuracy. Some of the reviewed proposals include an interactive mining
environment to satisfy user requirements. However, mining data streams is a
highly application oriented field and it is hard to generalize in broad contexts
such as query logs. Other approach, is to define a pre-processing step that can
guarantee quality of the results. However in this case data pre-processing is a
resource intensive step. Therefore, mining massive data streams that have privacy
protection in a network environment is a challenging task.
Also [75] presents a discussion on open challenges for data stream mining. The
identified challenges cover the full cycle of knowledge discovery and involve such
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problems as: protecting data privacy, dealing with legacy systems, handling in-
complete and delayed information, analysis of complex data, and evaluation of
stream mining algorithms. They conclude that in many cases it would be benefi-
cial to step aside from building upon existing offline approaches, and start blank
considering what is required in the stream setting.
Below we present the main data-stream input proposals, grouped according to
the data processing technique they use: Rank swapping, differential privacy, k-
anonymity and probabilistic k-anonymity.
2.1.2.1 Rank swapping
Rank swapping is a well known method for Statistical Disclosure Control, which
ranks the original data and then randomly exchanges the values between records
that are in near positions on that rank.
The method was first described for ordinal variables in [76]. Although initial ideas
associated to swapping data exist in other previous areas [77] where it is presented
as an alternative for the release of micro-data from a statistical database. Their
results show that the resulting data will be close to the original one in terms of
the desired statistics, but preserving the confidentiality of the original data. It
also becomes clear that approximate data-swapping can be applied practically to
large categorical databases with a range of statistical information that is to be
preserved. However, the study of approximate data-swapping is not complete, so
other methods must be sought.
Although originally described only for ordinal variables, we can also find other
methods proposed for any numerical variable [78]. In this case, values of variable
Vi are ranked in ascending order. Then, each ranked value of Vi is swapped with
another ranked value randomly chosen within a restricted range (e.g., the rank of
two swapped values cannot differ by more than p percent of the total number of
records).
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Detailed results could be found in [79], showing that rank swapping techniques
outperform the best micro-aggregation techniques up to this point. In fact, the
best performer is using a p around 15 percent.
All their proposals use structured data, to facilitate the arrangement of data in a
ranking using the value of an attribute. The implementation of masking random
noise used on the tests, uses a simple algorithm for uni-variate Gaussian noise
generation, and further tests with multivariate Gaussian noise is required. The
results show that information loss and number of re-identifications are highly de-
pendent on the set of variables and the number of categories in each variable. All
this makes these proposals less applicable to our goal.
A different approach [80] studies the application of rank swapping to numerical
data streams, composed by records referring to individuals or entities which are
generated as streams. In this case, the output can be stored for future analysis
or even analyzed in (close to) real time, without risking the disclosure of sensitive
information from the data. This method was studied in terms of information loss
and could be used as a starting point for considering rank swapping a candidate
to be applied in streaming data.
As seen in this section, the traditional approaches consist in using one variable at
a time for rank swapping, however at least a generalization of the method using
multivariate ranking/mapping functions should be defined as a first step to use
those methods over more complex data. However, this is not a trivial undertak-
ing, as more complex ranking/mapping could lead to very poor fits. Finally, no
application of ranking algorithms was found using query logs or other types of
unstructured data.
2.1.2.2 Differential privacy
As seen in 2.1.1.4, the concept of differential privacy was defined in [69]. The
same approach can also be applied to anonymize data-stream environments. In a
sample application [81], there is no release of the original query, but a synthetic
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one, obtained using semantic similarity. In this way, they preserve the cardinality
of the query logs, and also drive the distortion consistently with the semantics
of the queries. That is, the queries used as replacements of the original ones are
probabilistically chosen according to their semantic similarity and the desired level
of protection. This contributes to preserve the utility of the protected query logs.
However, the proposal remains untested using structured knowledge sources other
than Word-Net, such as ODP, YAGO or DBPedia, which may offer more detailed
and finer grained taxonomies that could also be used to increase the accuracy.
The lack of structure of query logs, combined with new terms which may not be
present into the semantic database, could represent a challenge for this approach.
Data micro-aggregation, which consists on grouping similar records/logs together
and replacing them by a representative value, can be used to decrease the sen-
sitivity of the differentially private mechanism proportionally to the size of the
data aggregation. The main challenge in this case, would be to adapt the micro-
aggregation algorithm, to the lack of structure of query logs.
Another limitation using differential privacy in a streaming environment is to
maintain a fixed privacy level. It is possible that no more data can be published
in order to preserve user’s privacy.
2.1.2.3 k-anonymity
As the previous methods, k-anonymity was also firstly proposed only for static data
sets. All the methods for static data anonymization cannot be directly applied to
anonymizing data streams, however, below we will follow the evolution of the
proposals regarding to k-anonymity in more complex environments.
The use of k-anonymity in high dimensional data, such as query logs, was studied
in [82]. This approach is relevant since k-anonymity was designed for structured
databases with a limited number of attributes. They discuss the effects of the curse
of high dimensionality on privacy preserving data mining algorithms. As more
attributes are added to the data, the possibility of inference attacks increases, as
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it is proportional to the number of possible combinations of attributes. Also in
their proposal, when the data contains a large number of attributes which may
be considered quasi-identifiers, it becomes difficult to anonymize the data without
an unacceptably high amount of information loss, and performance is severely
hampered with high dimensional data. This is because an exponential number of
combinations of dimensions can be used to make precise inference attacks. More
appropriate approaches must be sought.
A proposal that tries to improve the performance [83], presents a one-pass algo-
rithm, using weak clustering based data streams k-anonymity method for data
publishing. This method first measures information loss of each anonymous clus-
ter, then it considers data privacy and data protection achieved according to con-
tinuous classification attributes of data stream. It uses little processing time and
memory for each tuple of data steam, and both privacy preserving and utility of
anonymous data are considered. However, they found some concept drift, which
needs further research. Also some aspects of data anonymity remain untested.
Deeper anonymization schemes were proposed [84], integrating two approaches,
data stream management and privacy protection. They propose a method called
SKY (Stream K-anonymitY ) to continuously facilitate 6-constraint k-anonymity
on streaming data for privacy protection.
A similar approach can be found in [85], where they study a framework named
KIDS (K-anonymization Data Stream based on sliding window) to solve this prob-
lem by continuously k-anonymity on the sliding window. It adopts a top-down
specialization tree (TDS-Tree) for completing the k-anonymization, and adjust
the TDS-Tree with each update of sliding window. Regarding to the results, it
protects privacy of data stream and considers the distribute density of data in
data stream, thereby improve usefulness of data over previous methods.
Other alternatives using randomization exist [86]. They tackled the problem of
continuous privacy preserving publishing of data streams, by using an approach
which considers both the distribution of the data entries to be published and
the statistical distribution of the data stream. In some proposed applications, it
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is required to monitor certain statistics or maintain a classification model on a
published data stream.
However, those methods present some inconvenience. First, a delay, as they need
to wait for new tuples to cluster the data stream. Second, it is hard to determine
how the data stream could be published so that the privacy preserving requirement
is honored and the statistics and classification model can be mined as accurately
as possible.
A different clustering proposal [87] defines an algorithm to publish the tuples
without violating the anonymization principles and keep the information loss as
low as possible. They employ a clustering strategy with tuples at its core and a
cluster reusing strategy. The reuse constraint of the stored k-anonymized clusters
also sets a threshold to the size of the k-anonymized cluster set, which is vital to
the linear time and space complexity of the proposed algorithms. However some
issues remain unsolved. The clustering strategy may publish a newly arrived tuple
early before its time limit. So, it will cost extra information loss if the new tuple
can be published with lower information loss by a cluster created later. Moreover,
it is possible that the additional information loss caused by substituting another
tuple for the new tuple is greater than the information loss reduction acquired by
deferring its publication. However, the prediction process may be time-consuming.
We found another cluster-based proposal [88] based on a Fast Anonymizing Algo-
rithm for Numerical Streaming daTa (FAANST ), which can anonymize numerical
streaming data quite fast, while providing a moderate data loss. It uses a clus-
tering algorithm, k-means, which takes advantage of the concept of a centroid.
However, this concept can not be defined on categorical values, which arises the
main problem of this proposal, that it can only anonymize numerical data. Some
additional work to adapt this approach to support categorical attributes, could be
useful to our research.
Related to multivariate data-sets, an interesting approach [89] propose a Fast Data-
oriented Microaggregation algorithm (FDM ) that efficiently anonymizes large mul-
tivariate numerical data-sets for multiple successive values of k. The FDM can
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save a significant time and resource in protecting large numerical data-sets. It is
also shown that the method usually achieves a better trade-off between disclosure
risk and information loss measures. However, other data types different from the
numerical ones, remains untested.
Up to this point, presented methods are mainly based on clustering incoming
data streams. All of them need to wait for new tuples in order to build the
anonymized clusters. In order to avoid the problems inherent to accumulation-
based methods, the authors of [90], present a delay-free anonymization framework
for preserving the privacy of electronic health data streams. Input streams are
anonymized immediately with counterfeit values. However, data utility of the
anonymization results remains low and the counterfeit values unmanaged. Also
data throughput of the proposal is low to process high volumes of data.
Despite being interesting, an important issue of traditional k-anonymity ap-
proaches is the difficulty of using unstructured streams of data while satisfying
the aforementioned privacy properties. Some of them are not fast enough, which
poses an additional problem to WSEs requiring, moreover, real-time processing.
Also, enforcing strict k-anonymity implies variability loss and therefore quality
loss. This is especially serious in a scenario with informed intruders, who know
the values of some confidential attributes as these attributes can be viewed as
additional quasi-identifiers. The more quasi-identifier attributes, the more data
quality loss is caused by k-anonymity. So we continue to seek alternative strategies
that allow us to overcome those limitations.
2.1.2.4 Probabilistic k-anonymity
The concept of probabilistic k-anonymity was introduced on [91], which relaxes the
indistinguishability requirement of k-anonymity. More precisely, it only requires
that the probability of re-identification is maintained, with regard to the case of
k-anonymity. Like standard k-anonymity, probabilistic k-anonymity guarantees
that the probability of correct re-identification is at most 1
k
, but without explicitly
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requiring that the quasi-identifier attributes take identical values within each group
of k records.
Their work shows that, for a fixed re-identification probability 1
k
, the proba-
bilistic k-anonymity methods are much more quality-preserving than standard
k-anonymity enforcement.
An evolution of the concept can be seen in [92]. In this case they propose a system
that dynamically anonymizes data to compile privacy-preserving query logs that
may be monetized. The proposed scheme has been designed to process queries as
fast as possible, to be able to process all the queries received by a WSE. It also
takes into account the degree of privacy of the individuals.
Probabilistic k-anonymity does not have the same limitations as those we have
seen so far. By relaxing the requirement of indistinguishability, a better use of the
data may be accomplished. Another improvement that brings the application of
these methods to query logs is that the original queries can be released, instead of
having them replaced with some synthetic ones, just as with many of the previous
described techniques.
Proposals in this section point in the same direction. From all the studied alter-
natives, this seems the one which better suits our needs. On the negative side,
given the continuous generalization of unstructured dataset elements, a certain
imprecision is added to the generated profiles. Existing limitations in the related
literature [92] are found in terms of classification methods, which are very basic.
Hence, resulting in a low category count that leads to high degrees of data utility
loss.
2.2 Survey on Client Side Proposals
One may argue that WSEs have no motivation to protect the privacy of their user.
Indeed, user may be seen as the only interested party responsible to protect data
privacy. Under this assumption, we find some protection approaches which do not
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expect any collaboration between WSEs and user. Such approaches can be classi-
fied in two main categories: i) obfuscation techniques and ii) anonymous channels.
Obfuscation techniques generate noise to distort the user’s profile managed by the
WSEs. Anonymous channels assume an infrastructure between user and WSE to
handle the profiling of activities. The use of client side techniques are assumed
to generate non-realistic profiles that may have an adverse effect on the services
provided by WSEs.
2.2.1 Obfuscation Techniques
Early techniques assume the introduction of random queries (e.g., fake queries), in
order to obscure user’s profile. Random queries must be indistinguishable from the
real queries. This property is known as unobservability. Representative solutions
based on obfuscation techniques can be classified according to the number of users
that participate in the protocol. We found standalone solutions and distributed
solutions. Standalone solutions assume individual user handling their own privacy
in front of the WSE. Distributed solutions assume groups of users working together
to protect the privacy of each user. Next, we provide some examples for each
category.
2.2.1.1 Standalone Systems
These schemes generate synthetic queries that are used to hide the real queries
of the user [11, 62, 93–99]. Synthetic queries are submitted together with the
real queries, obfuscating the profiles that the WSE owns for each user. If the
synthetic queries are in some way semantically related to the user’s queries, the
obfuscated profile will still be usable, i.e., the WSE will be able to personalize
the user’s results. When the synthetic queries are semantically unrelated to the
user’s queries, the profile will be heterogenous and the personalization will be less
accurate. This does not mean that one alternative is better than the other, since a
user may have different preferences regarding of the trade-off between privacy and
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utility. However, some works show that it is possible to distinguish real queries
from synthetic queries [97, 100–102]. These works rely on the idea that machine-
generated queries do not have the same features as human-generated queries.
2.2.1.2 Distributed Systems
These schemes require the collaboration of a group of users that work in partner-
ship to protect their privacy, i.e., they hide their actions within the actions of many
others [103–109]. Typically, these schemes put a user into a large group where they
submit requests on behalf of other members. Users exchange their queries. Person-
alization is only possible if the members of the group share the same interests [3].
In some proposals [103–105], there is a central node that poses a bottleneck in
the overall system performance. In other cases, one type of path [103, 106–109]
is created to submit the query or a group of users must be created [103–105]. In
both cases, a significant delay is introduced [3].
2.2.2 Anonymous Channels
Proposals under this category use anonymous infrastructures [110, 111] in order
to send user’s queries to the WSE. By concealing user’s identity associated to the
queries, WSEs are assumed to be unable to profile the user. However, this may
affect the quality of the service offered by the WSEs to the user.
Chaum’s mix networks [112] are representative cases of solutions under the cat-
egory of anonymous channels. Messages pass through several nodes. Each node
disassociates the input messages from the output messages, by means of cryp-
tography [110, 111]. Evolved techniques assume the use of proxies [113], relying
connections (e.g., queries) from user to the recipient (e.g., the WSE). The key con-
cept is that the proxy delivers the messages but does not disclose the source (e.g.,
the user’ identity). DuckDuckGo3, Start Page4 and Yippy5 are some significant
3https://duckduckgo.com/
4https://www.startpage.com/
5https://www.yippy.com/
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examples using proxy-like infrastructures. By using these solutions, user transfer
their trust from WSEs to the proxies (i.e., user must assume that proxies do not
monitor or log their traffic).
Web MIXes [114] provides anonymous and unobservable real-time Internet access.
It incorporates an authentication mechanism in order to prevent flood attacks.
Additionally, it includes a feedback system with an interface that informs user
about their current level of protection. However, some flaws in their authentica-
tion process may allow external attackers to perform replay attacks [115]. The
synchronous nature of Web MIXes may also generate problems when dealing with
asynchronous TCP/IP networks [116].
The use of onion routing [117] to establish anonymous channels under the context
of queries and WSEs has also been proposed in the literature [118]. General
purpose plugins, and modified web-browsers6 using the Tor Project [119], are user-
friendly solutions based on the onion routing paradigm. Similarly, the Invisible
Internet Project (I2P) [120] builds an anonymous network layer designed to be
used for anonymous communication. Nonetheless, several weaknesses have been
reported [121], and Tor does not attempt to offer security against passive global
adversaries [111].
2.3 Survey on Collaborative WSE-Client Pro-
posals
Solutions under this category assume that user and WSE work together in order
to protect user’s privacy. Next, we report solutions under this category in three
main groups: i) Private Information Retrieval; ii) Platform for Privacy Preferences
(P3P); and iii) Context-based Retrieval.
6https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/
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2.3.1 Private Information Retrieval
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) schemes [122–125] enable user to obtain in-
formation from a database privately, i.e., the server cannot know what information
was retrieved. Through a PIR scheme, user can search documents stored in the
database and recover those of their interest. The problem of submitting a query
to a WSE while preserving the user’s privacy is equivalent to the PIR problem.
However, PIR schemes suffer from two practical problems that make them not
appropriate for WSEs [104]: PIR schemes are not suitable for large databases,
and user is assumed to know the precise location of the records to be recovered.
2.3.2 Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P)
The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) [126, 127] was created by the World
Wide Web Consortium (W3C) with the objective of making easier for user to
obtain information about the privacy policies of the sites that they visit. P3P
is a framework through which user can automate the protection of their privacy.
They can define their privacy preferences and, when a website does not conform to
these preferences, then P3P-enabled browsers may alert the user and even take pre-
established actions (e.g., deny access to cookies). The Do-Not-Track initiative [128]
is a policy-based P3P system in which HTTP headers request web applications
not to track the user. The web application must be P3P-complaint in order to
be effective. It has been studied in several works [129–131] and standardized
by W3C. However, it is considered as an obsolete protocol nowadays. In fact,
P3P-like solutions have been criticized due to the impact that governmental laws
may have over the user [132], the lack of follow-up from websites w.r.t. privacy-
protection mandates in their legal jurisdictions (e.g., compliance difficulties of
websites to enforce their own privacy policies) [133], and low number of potential
adopters [134].
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2.3.3 Context-based Retrieval
Context-based retrieval proposals aim at storing user profiles (e.g., search history)
on the client’s machine. This information allows to obtain user’s interests and
re-rank search results according to them. WSE and user participate together in
the searching process in order to obtain the final results, i.e., the WSE receives
the query and returns the results. Then, these results are re-ranked at the client-
side. The User-Centered Adaptive Information Retrieval (UCAIR) project [135]
collects and exploits available user context from submitted queries and clicked
results. Similar schemes allows user to choose the content and degree of details
of their profiles exposed to the WSE [13, 136, 137]. In the end, user determine
the profile content that is revealed to the WSE when a query is submitted. The
adjustment of parameters associated to the stored profiles is possible, in order to
improve the quality of the results. Potential disadvantages of these proposals relate
to performance and effectiveness limitations of results ranked at the client (i.e.,
much less effective than ranking the results at the server side) [135]. Moreover,
it is expected that WSEs can still profile the user after several executions of the
approach.
2.4 Final thoughts
Within this broad classification that we have studied extensively, three main types
of proposals were found, regarding to the actor who applies them: server-side,
client-side or collaborative proposals.
We assumed that for monetization purposes the goal of WSE is to preserve as much
data utility as possible, the feasibility of client side approaches seems limited in
this context. As already discussed, introduction of fake queries, delayed response
time as well as mixed user profiles, generate drawbacks in result’s data utility.
Regarding to collaborative proposals between WSE and clients, we found distinct
approaches. Private Information Retrieval (PIR) schemes, that have turned out
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not suitable for large databases, like the ones on a WSE environment. Platform
for Privacy Preferences (P3P) solutions have been criticized due to the impact
that governmental laws may have over the user, the lack of follow-up and low
number of potential adopters. Finally Context-based Retrieval showed potential
disadvantages related to performance and effectiveness limitations of results ranked
at the client. Additionally, it is expected that WSEs can still profile the user after
several interactions. Therefore, a certain degree of trust must be deposited in the
server, even when achieving a reduced data utility, as shown.
Therefore, server side approaches seem more appropriate to maximise both privacy
and data utility over large amount of data. Such approaches use two great types
of methods to protect data, those who use perturbative techniques and those who
use nonperturbative techniques.
With perturbative approaches, the data-set is distorted before publication. As a
result, unique combinations in the original data may disappear and new combi-
nations may appear in the perturbed data. Such changes may be beneficial for
preserving confidentiality, but may have an adverse effect in relation to data utility.
On the other hand, nonperturbative methods do not alter original data, which is
more appropriate to preserve data utility. These methods use techniques such as
global recoding, partial suppression and sampling, to preserve user confidentiality.
From the point of view of their data input, server side anonymization methods fall
into the following two broad categories: fixed-length input and data-stream input.
We will analyze them in the sequel.
2.4.1 Fixed-length input
We found some works that try to anonymize textual query logs, but that do not
consider the dynamic nature of those sources of data, and treat them as a fixed-
length input. Fixed-length input approaches, work well only with static data.
This implies that, if they were used to anonymize query logs, these sources of data
must be “closed” before applying any procedure.
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According to this, and depending on their size, two main options are considered:
i) the query logs to be anonymized contain all the queries received from time 0
until now; or ii) the query logs to be anonymized correspond just to a short and
limited period of time.
In the first option, with all the queries received from time 0, the anonymization
method in use will deal with a huge quantity of data; even worse, query logs are
expected to grow daily and, hence, each anonymization process will be required
to process bigger amounts of data. In order to show the relevance of this problem,
it has to be noted that usual anonymization methods that provide k-anonymity
in databases have shown significant limitations when dealing with large quantities
of data. For example, well-known SDC techniques based on generalization or
micro-aggregation suffer from a very high cost when performing the partition of
the database, in this way, authors have reported quadratic costs in this steps
that clearly disqualifies these techniques for the volume of information that is
considered in this case [138]. Being more specific, the authors in [139] apply
semantic micro-aggregation to anonymize WSE query logs and their conclusion
is that these techniques do not fit well with large sets of data that require a
continuous update of the anonymization due to new data being added continuously.
Regarding the second case, anonymizing a short period of time, an organization
that builds query logs can work with “limited” sets of data by means of classifying
received search queries by week, month, trimester or semester; then, at the end
of the chosen period of time, just the corresponding and limited query log is
anonymized and disclosed. This option clearly alleviates the cost required by the
anonymization method in use; however, it only focus on a specific window of time,
which implies that a lot of queries are discarded and, hence, the accuracy of the
anonymized outputs is expected to be jeopardized due to the loss of information.
In conclusion, “closing” query logs, which are a dynamic source of data that is
continuously growing with new search queries issued by the WSE ’s user, is contrary
to their real nature and it has been acknowledged in the literature that it is an
ineffective strategy. It may be interesting from a research point of view, but
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hard to translate to a real environment. As a consequence, we need to focus on
methods for real-time processing that may be applied to the considered scenario,
using data-streams.
2.4.2 Data-stream input
As we have seen to this point, WSE query logs produce a huge volume of data
which needs to be dynamically treated and that grows continuously. This fact
makes traditional methods not practical for their application in this context, and
only data-stream based methods seem to make sense.
If we look for proposals with this approach on the literature, we have found some
custom designed methods to privacy-preserve data on a streaming context. How-
ever, the fast proposals focus only on structured information. More specifically,
the considered data input is mainly numerical, which is the main limitation when
considering its possible application to the anonymization of WSE query logs. As
it has been shown, in query logs of the WSE s it is usual to find unstructured data
made of both textual and numerical data referring to searched keywords.
The proposals closer to our needs, are the ones that use methods of probabilistic k-
anonymity, but unfortunately, these methods are in an early stage of development
and therefore we should work on improving them. If we could improve them, the
result could be an interesting approach to anonymize query logs.
In addition, we want to consider the utility of the resulting anonymized data.
This is a critical aspect to facilitate the exploitation of data to third parties.
Therefore, a study of the differences in the utility of the data is essential, and we
have not found it in the previous described methods. This fact, in conjunction
with the limitations that we have exposed shows that there is still room in the
literature for new schemes specially designed to anonymize dynamic query logs
while maximizing the data utility.
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Non-perturbative approaches seem more suitable to facilitate the exploitation of
data by third parties with the adequate protection of sensible user information,
owing to the fact that they achieve a high level of data utility.
Therefore, our proposal will focus on suitable non-perturbative server side meth-
ods to deal with a data-stream input in real time. The use of probabilistic k-
anonymity, seems appropriate to bound disclosure risk of personally identifiable
user attributes. Additionally, our solution should be able to handle unstructured
data. It should provide a fast probabilistic method to blend streams of queries with
high similarity to those requiring protection, but coming from different users.
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Chapter 3
Working at the WSE side to
generate privacy-preserving user
profiles
3.1 Introduction
The popularity of Web Search Engines (WSEs) has grown with the number of
websites present on the Internet. According to the Netcraft January 2020 Web
Server Survey, there exist 1 295 973 827 (over 1.2 billion) websites, 249 618 033
unique domains, and 9 576 845 web-facing computers [140]. Therefore, it can be
assumed that WSEs will continue to be essential to surf the Web.
When a person submits a query to a WSE, it looks for the requested information
among its indexed web pages, but it also stores the submitted query (i.e., the
keywords) and some metadata (e.g., date of the query, some identifiers of the
query issuer, which specific search result was selected by the issuer, etc.). As a
result, everyone who uses a WSE is disclosing personal data, such as personal
characteristics and preferences, and enabling WSEs to compile those query logs.
45
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Query logs make up a set of unstructured data, which is generated as a continuous
data stream. Although a fast process could protect query logs prior to their
publication, there is no absolute guarantee of anonymity, as the combination of
modified data may disclose enough information to re-identify some users [19, 141].
As an example, there is one well-known case, the AOL scandal, in which around 36
million queries performed by AOL’s costumers were publicly disclosed. Although
records were previously de-identified, it was possible to identify some users from
the disclosed query logs and other sensitive information was exposed [40]. This
case ended up with an important damage to AOL users’ privacy and to AOL itself,
with several lawsuits against the company [42].
Therefore, in order to get viable data monetization, better tools capable of mod-
ifying query logs by limiting the privacy disclosure risk but preserving as much
data utility as possible should be provided. More specifically, in this chapter, we
propose using a server side software capable of processing queries, as unstructured
data, in real time and building anonymized query logs that still retain enough data
utility to allow its monetization. As a result, WSEs may then offer the protected
query logs to external organizations for data monetization purposes while keeping
the real query logs in a safe place; otherwise, WSEs may also decide to only keep
protected logs, getting in turn a lower risk of information disclosure in case of a
direct attack.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 3.2, we define the
requirements of the system. In Section 3.3, we describe in detail the proposal,
used to implement the system. In Section 3.4, we analyze the results. In Section
3.5, we highlight the conclusions we have reached.
3.2 Requirements
Our proposal, in a nutshell, is based on a server-side architecture that enables
WSEs to anonymize query logs in a streaming environment. The outputs of this
system are two: i) a real-time stream of anonymized logs; and ii) a database of
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user profiles. The main target is to allow WSEs to sell or release both data sets
to interested third parties without threatening the privacy of the individuals who
have filled the query logs with their issued search queries. In order to achieve that,
the resulting outputs must fulfill certain requirements that are next detailed.
3.2.1 Privacy requirements
The main requirement for the proposed system is that it must preserve the privacy
of the individuals who contribute to the WSE query logs.
Privacy could be achieved by means of query de-identification, following one of
the following approaches:
• Full de-identification: it is achieved when all identifiers, direct and indi-
rect, are removed and there is no reasonable basis to believe that remaining
information can be used to identify an individual.
• Partial de-identification: it is achieved when only direct identifiers are
removed (indirect ones remain).
• Statistical de-identification: it is achieved by maintaining a trade-off be-
tween keeping as much useful data as possible while guaranteeing statistically
acceptable data privacy.
Direct identifiers (e.g., full name, national id, etc.) can be easily removed from
query logs. However, the textual content of search queries may contain any possible
value of any domain; this is very likely to produce cases in which may be very
difficult to distinguish identifying queries from innocuous ones. As a result, in the
considered scenario full de-identification requirement cannot be guaranteed.
Partial de-identification is easier to achieve and, additionally, more data utility
may also be preserved. However, it is prone to record-linkage attacks [54] that
would allow to re-identify users by means of certain apparently innocuous queries.
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Statistical de-identification seems the more suitable approach. It is obta-
ined trough certain statistical criteria and anonymization techniques, being k-
anonymity and its extension l-diversity the two most widely accepted models.
Those models were proposed for structured data [85, 86, 142]. However, the cur-
rent proposal seeks to prove its usefulness also when anonymizing unstructured
data streams.
3.2.2 Functional requirements
To enable the use of current proposal in a real environment, it must also fulfill a
set of functional requirements:
• Scalability: It is the capability of a system to handle a growing amount
of work, or its potential to be enlarged in order to accommodate that
growth [143]. Specifically we want to achieve load scalability, that is the
ability to easily expand or contract to accommodate heavier or lighter loads.
Scalability methods fall into two broad categories [144]: i) Horizontal scala-
bility which is related to the ability of a system to add more working nodes,
such as a new computer; and ii) Vertical scalability which is related to the
ability of adding resources to a single node in a system, typically involving
the addition of CPUs or memory. Both approaches have their own trade-
offs, and the proposed architecture should take advantage of all the available
resources. Configuring an existing idle system has always been the less ex-
pensive alternative, regardless of the approach. So the proposed architecture
should be designed to take advantage of this fact and, therefore, it should
use the existing WSE infrastructure.
• Processing speed: In order to minimize delays generating anonymized data
stream, a high processing speed should be a main requirement. It’s also fun-
damental in order to being able to process all requests received by the WSE.
A WSE receives every second thousands of queries. For example, Google is
processing in average 40000 queries per second [145]. This fact implies that
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the new proposal should be able to meet similar speed requirements as the
ones met by WSEs.
• Resource consumption: As an additional requirement, the resource con-
sumption of the system must be low, in order to facilitate its inclusion in
an existing WSE, minimizing overhead cost. Even though the system is
supposed to scale with added resources, it is important to not increase un-
reasonably current WSEs resource consumption.
• Transparency: To ease the integration of the proposed system in existing
WSEs architectures, it must be transparent. New modules can hid internal
details, making them invisible for the main architecture, i.e. encapsulated.
Mainly, they should adhere to previous external interfaces without chang-
ing them, while changing its internal behavior, i.e. generating anonymized
query logs with the same structure than original logs. The main purpose of
providing a transparent system is to avoid changing any existing part of the
WSE to be integrated with.
• Modularity: As explained above, the proposed solution should be easily in-
tegrable in an existing WSE. According to this, functional scalability should
be achieved, i.e. being able to enhance the system by adding new function-
ality at minimal cost. To do achieve this, the proposed system should be
designed to be modular and to have low coupling and high cohesion.
3.2.3 Utility requirements
Although full de-identification is desirable from a privacy point of view, ideally,
preserving the privacy of the individuals should be compatible with allowing WSEs
to sell non-sensitive user information to third parties. Logically, the economical
value of these privacy-safe data will directly depend on its remaining quality from
the utility point of view. As a result, there is a clear trade-off between anonymizing
logs and keeping them useful to extract information through data mining processes.
Therefore, the main challenge related to data utility is to anonymize sensitive user
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data, removing as few information as possible in order to have enough interesting
information to be analyzed.
To achieve this, the proposed system aims to build fake logs and user profiles
which should retain users’ interests (maximizing the data utility) and eliminate
any direct or quasi-identifier that could allow their re-identification (maximizing
the user privacy). It should be as difficult as possible to relocate queries in order
to build the original profile of a certain user.
3.3 Proposal
In Figure 3.1, three sub-systems that conform the proposed scheme are depicted.
Note that, from those sub-systems, only the WSE Anonymizer should be inte-
grated into the WSE environment. The other two are just defined to evaluate
proposed method.
3.3.1 Actors
The main actors considered in the proposed process are the following:
• WSE: The web search engine. It builds the original query logs and it has
the target of generating an anonymized version together with a users’ profile
database in order to sell or disclose them for economical purposes.
• Customer: Represents a third party who wants to legitimately access the
anonymized query logs and the users’ profile database.
• Attacker: Represents a third party who wants to gain illegitimate access
to the original query logs using as input the anonymized query logs and the
users’ profile database.
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Figure 3.1: Main Architecture
3.3.2 Phases
Current study is divided into the following phases:
• Anonymization and profile creation: Main phase, which takes the origi-
nal query logs generated by the WSE as input and generates the anonymized
query logs and a database of user profiles as outputs.
• Anonymization analysis: Anonymization and performance benchmark-
ing, taking into account original data, anonymization time and resource us-
age.
• De-anonymization: Using the anonymized query logs as input, an attack
is simulated, trying to link anonymized logs with the users that issued them.
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• Analysis: De-Anonymization and performance benchmarking, taking into
account original and anonymized data, time and resource usage.
3.3.3 Interactions
As the system is designed to anonymize a stream of query logs in real time, inter-
actions are defined by production and consumption of streams of logs. The main
interaction is defined between a WSE as producer, and a customer as consumer
of the anonymized logs. An attacker will try to gain access to the anonymized
stream of logs, such as any legitimate client and, then, it will try to de-anonymize
them in order to recover the original query logs.
3.3.4 Anonymization and profile creation
In Figure 3.2, the main modules of the anonymization and profile creation sub-
systems are represented. Each of them is responsible of a single action. All modules
are described below.
3.3.4.1 Classifier
Represented in Algorithm 1, the classifier uses query logs generated on the WSE
as main input. It also needs access to a database of entropies, recommendations
and categories for a given word. Once the classifier receives an user query, it’s
processed and categorized in real time. Then the categorized query is released.
The process followed by the classifier is divided into the following stages:
• Natural language processing: Which is applied to query’s text field to
extract its semantic units (SUs) [62]. Only nouns or adjectives are used.
Then the HIPAA [146] Privacy Rule is applied, to remove all the SUs that
could be considered identifiers or quasi-identifiers, such as a name, address,
phone number etc.
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Figure 3.2: Anonymization and profile creation
• Recommendation: To correct possible misspellings, selected SUs are val-
idated against a recommendation database, which returns the correct term
in case of a misspelled word.
• Entropies: The amount of information (entropies) are calculated for each
of the remaining SUs. To do so, a database of entropies is used, which should
provide the number of references on the WSE for a given term. The algorithm
will chose as main SU the one which has less references, which is assumed
to be the most specific and, hence, informative term of the query [147].
• Categorization: The corresponding category for the query is then cal-
culated using main SU and a database of categories, obtaining the most
specific topic of the query.
As a representative example of how the Classifier works, let us assume an input
query whose keywords are: “european soccer barcelona players”. The first step
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Algorithm 1: Classifier
Input : query logs, entropies, recommendations, categories
Output: categorized logs
1 foreach log ∈ query logs do
2 SUs← lemmatize(log);
3 min entropy ←∞;
4 foreach SU ∈ SUs do
5 l← recommendation(SU);
6 e← entropy(SU);
7 if e < min entropy then
8 min entropy ← e;
9 main SU ← l;
10 end
11 log category ← category(main SU);
12 send log, log category;
13 end
of this process extracts the SUs: “european soccer”, “barcelona” and “players”.
Next, entropies are calculated for each SU, getting the following results according
to Google’s WSE: “european soccer”: 56 500 000 results; “barcelona”: 504 000 000
results; and “players”: 544 000 000 results. According to these numbers, “euro-
pean soccer” is selected as the main SU of the input query. In the last step,
“european soccer” (as main SU) is used to assign a corresponding category of
interest to the input query by means of a knowledge base. In this way, if the Open
Directory Project (ODP) 1 is used as knowledge base and queried with “european
soccer”, retrieving “Sports” as the resulting category. Therefore, the input query
is categorized as related to “Sports”.
3.3.4.2 Anonymizer
Represented in Algorithm 2, it uses as input the categorized logs that are generated
in real time by the classifier (see the previous explanation for more details about
this). Those logs are split in two sets for each category, one that stores the users,
and another that stores the text of the queries. When a category set reaches the
maximum allowed value, defined by k, the algorithm randomly takes an user and
1Open Directory Project. http://www.dmoz.org/
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a query from that category and builds with those the anonymized query with a
minimum delay.
Algorithm 2: Anonymizer
Input : categorized logs, k, δ
Output: Anonymized logs
1 foreach log ∈ categorized logs do
2 user, query, category ← log;
3 users[category]← user;
4 query[category]← query;
5 if size(users[category]) = k then
6 if ∀u ∈ users[category], ∃u 6= user then
7 pop random u ∈ users[category];
8 pop random q ∈ query[category];
9 send u, q;
10 else k = k ∗ δ;
11 end
A special case occurs when all users stored in certain category set are the same.
In this case, the selected user would be the same than the original one. In order
to prevent this situation (which, in any case, it is very unlikely to happen due
to the huge quantity of queries that a WSE receives each second), we impose an
additional restriction, not shown in Algorithm 2 for simplicity: When all users in a
certain category are the same, the anonymizer must increment the corresponding
k value. This is done by multiplying k by a δ value.
As an example of how the proposed Anonymizer works, let us assume that the
system works with parameter k = 4 and that in the data structure in charge of
storing queries related to “Sports” there are already stored three queries: i)“novak
djokovic tennis titles”, sent by user A; ii)“monza formula1 tickets”, sent by user
B; and iii)“champions league final”, sent by user C. The Anonymizer receives the
query “european soccer barcelona players” that has been categorized as “Sports”
in the last phase by the Classifier. The data structure “Sports” contains now four
queries so, it is full, according to k; therefore, one of the stored queries is selected
at random and it is assigned to a sender at random too. Following this example,
let us assume that “champions league final” and user A are randomly selected. As
a result, an anonymized log is outputted where user A is now linked to “champions
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league final” instead of to her original query “novak djokovic tennis titles”. It can
be seen that, by doing this, the generality is kept (i.e., A is interested in “Sports”)
while the specificity is eliminated (i.e., A was specifically interested in “Tennis”
instead of “Soccer”). As explained in works such as [148], keeping general interests
improves the utility of the anonymized data while hiding specific interests is useful
to preserve the privacy of the respondents.
3.3.4.3 Profiler
This element uses as input the anonymized record generated by the anonymizer
and the corresponding category. With this data a user profile is created or updated
in real-time. Therefore, the profiler is in charge of keeping the profile database
updated. As it has been explained in the Introduction, in the literature, a user
profile is generally considered a set of well-defined categories of interests (e.g.,
science, health, society, sports, etc.) with a certain weight assigned to each one
according to the evidences generated by the corresponding user and how they have
been classified under each category [11].
As an example of how the proposed Profiler works, let us assume that the system
uses the following set of categories: Arts, Health, Shopping, Science, Computers,
Sports, Society and Business (note that the proposed system is not bounded to
this set of categories, this is only an example). Let us assume also that a certain
individual has already sent: 5 queries related to Science; 10 queries related to
Business; 20 queries related to Arts; 5 queries related to Health and 10 queries
related to Computers. As a result, the current profile for that person stored in
the profile database is: (Arts: 40%, Health: 10%, Shopping: 0%, Science: 10%,
Computers: 20%, Sports: 0%, Society: 0%, Business: 20%). Now, let us assume
that this person is assigned to the new query “champions league final” by the
Anonymizer, this query has been categorized as “Sports” by the Classifier. The
Profiler obtains the new evidence and updates the corresponding user profile as
follows: (Arts: 39.2%, Health: 9.8%, Shopping: 0%, Science: 9.8%, Computers:
19.6%, Sports: 1.9%, Society: 0%, Business: 19.6%).
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3.3.5 De-anonymization
The purpose of this process is to try to link the anonymized logs with the indi-
viduals who generated them. By this way, the system tries to evaluate whether
the anonymization process executed previously has been successful or not and,
therefore, whether the resulting protected query logs can be disclosed or not.
As seen in Figure 3.3, the de-anonymization process is very similar to the ano-
nymization one. We assume that the attacker has already gained access to the
stream of anonymized logs generated by the WSE. Those logs are the main input
for the process.
Classifier
Query
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Categorized
logs
De-
Anonymizer
Anonymized
logs
Profiles
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Entropies
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Categories
Figure 3.3: De-anonymization
First of all, the input logs should be classified by the attacker. Best de-anonymiza-
tion could be achieved if the attacker manages to get the same categorization used
by the WSE (this is also the worst-case scenario form a privacy point of view). As
result, the attacker can use Algorithm 1 to categorize the anonymized logs prior
to perform their de-anonymization. In this way, the attacker also needs access to
a database of entropies, recommendations and categories.
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Then, each categorized log is send to the de-anonymizer algorithm, which will try
to recover the original query logs. Several de-anonymizer algorithms are proposed
and tested on next section. All of them share the same basic structure, shown on
Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: De-anonymizer
Input : categorized logs, k, δ
Output: query logs
1 foreach log ∈ categorized logs do
2 user, query, category ← log;
3 users[category]← user;
4 query[category]← query;
5 if size(users[category]) = k then
6 if ∀u ∈ users[category], ∃u 6= user then
7 pop selected u ∈ users[category];
8 pop selected q ∈ query[category];
9 send u, q;
10 else k = k ∗ δ;
11 end
The de-anonymization algorithm also uses two additional parameters, k and δ.
Their function is the same than in Algorithm 2. An attacker will always attempt
to use similar values to the ones used in the anonymization process.
Each de-anonymizer variation defines a different pop selected function, and some
specific data structures, represented with dashed lines on Figure 3.3. All those
variations are detailed in Section 3.4.
Following the same example used to explain the work of the Anonymizer, in this
case, the De-anonymizer takes as input the anonymized query logs. Let us assume
that this is: i) “champions league final”, sent by A; ii) “monza formula1 tickets”,
sent by Z; iii) “novak djokovic tennis titles”, sent by B; and iv) “european soccer
barcelona players”, sent by C. The De-anonymizer first categorizes the anonymi-
zed query logs to ascertain the category of interest linked to each query (as done in
the anonymization process) and then tries to link a certain query with its original
sender. The process followed to do that may vary and different approaches are
explained in the Implementation section. A simple approach would be to match
sender and query keywords at random (as done in the anonymization process).
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Using this method in this example may lead to match B with “european soccer
barcelona players” which would get a failure in the de-anonymization process, or
with “monza formula1 tickets” which would get a success.
3.3.6 Analysis
Finally we also need a basic algorithm to verify that the proposed scheme is work-
ing properly, this is a log matcher. More concretely, it gets two log streams as
input, and returns the number of matching logs, i.e. identical logs appearing in
the two input streams. A resource profiler is also needed for a proper analysis,
which at least should calculate amount of time and resources used in each task.
3.4 Evaluation
In this section, the implementation used to test our proposal is described. All the
conducted tests are also detailed. Finally a discussion of system performance in
terms of user’s privacy, functional requirements and data utility is provided.
3.4.1 Implementation
All algorithms described in Section 3.2 were implemented in Python. Input and
output query logs are stored in plain text files preserving the original format of
logs. Communication between modules was also done via plain text files, to enable
posterior analysis, but all modules could also use a sockets based communication.
A No-SQL database, was used to store user profiles as well as other persistent data.
Beside those implementation decisions, all other major changes that have been
made to the initial algorithms during the implementation process, are discussed
below.
Classification is a complex task to achieve outside of a WSE context, mainly
because, besides the original logs, some additional information is required. As
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previously described, the proposed algorithm needs a database of word entropies,
a database of word recommendations and a database of word categories. In a
WSE, this information would be provided by the WSE itself. It should be noted
that a WSE already generates some of this information with each search, therefore
it would not represent an extra cost. Outside of a WSE, this information should
be retrieved querying an external WSE during the classification process but, by
doing this, the obtained results in terms of time and resource usage may differ
significantly from the ones that would be achieved in a real environment. In order
to prevent this situation, a web scrapper was implemented as a preparatory step.
The web scrapper retrieves information from remote sources and creates three
local No-SQL databases that are the ones used in the classification step, therefore
obtaining an environment similar to a real one.
Once classifying the data, we also need a way to lemmatize each query text, which
is a phrase written on natural language. As the system was implemented in Python,
the NLTK package (Natural Language Toolkit) 2. This package provides interfaces
to corpora and lexical resources such as WordNet, along with text processing
libraries. On preliminary tests, NLTK was very slow for the requisites of our
system, but due to the fact that it is a very generic system prepared for a wide
variety of texts, uses and situations, a modified version of NLTK designed to fulfill
our requirements was developed. This modified NLTK showed the same utility as
the original package when dealing with query logs but it became hundreds orders
of magnitude faster due to their focus on a more specific duty.
3.4.2 Evaluation methodology
In order to evaluate the architecture proposed in Section 3.2 we have implemented
our system as described in Section 3.4.1. Only those systems which would be
used on a real environment are evaluated regarding privacy, functional and utility
requirements.
2Natural language toolkit. http://www.nltk.org/
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Table 3.1: AOL query log example
1887264 5424618 ninja turtles rap lyrics 2006-05-22 17:04:54 1 http://www.lyrics007.com
1887267 5424618 myspace.com 2006-05-22 17:55:28 2 http://music.myspace.com
1887549 5426574 rio hotel and casino 2006-03-20 18:36:01 5 http://www.destination360.com
1887552 5426574 orleans hotel casino 2006-03-21 16:06:02 3 http://www.tickco.com
2536798 9146863 invest in spring drinking water 2006-03-07 13:51:21 2 http://www.fool.com
2536814 9146863 spring water stocks to buy 2006-03-13 22:13:44 4 http://importer.alibaba.com
3.4.2.1 Data
We ran our experiments on logs released by AOL 3 stored on plain text files,
and on a database of word entropies, a database of word recommendations and
a database of word categories, stored in a NoSQL database. Released AOL data
contains 36 389 576 query logs, corresponding to a period of three months of real
activity. Table 3.1 provides a brief sample of the used logs.
Databases of word entropies, recommendations and categories are created using
the web scrapper defined in Subsection 3.4.1. Since the database content is gen-
erated based on logs content, databases only contain log related data, which can
slightly affect system performance measures. A first attempt of data gathering
was conducted using Google but it applies a very restrictive limit to the number
of search queries from a certain source that can be served; as a result, our pro-
cesses were blocked. Finally, Microsoft Bing was used to fill word entropies and
recommendations databases. To create database of word categories, Open Direc-
tory Project (ODP) was used. ODP is a large, categorized directory of websites
and pages, which is managed by volunteers.
Once the databases were created, no other query was done to any WSE, and all
tests were conducted using those databases as the only data repository. At the end
of scrapping process, databases contained 1 587 451 word categorizations, 1 751 632
word entropies and 258 504 word recommendations. Note that some query logs
contain a query text with no understandable value. Grammatical mistakes were
resolved using a word recommendation database. Other queries contain no query
text, or it does not make any sense, being just lots of consonants concatenated.
As a category for those last logs cannot be found, they were discarded.
3AOL keyword searches. http://www.gregsadetsky.com/aol-data/
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3.4.2.2 Conducted tests
Only two parameters can be modified in the proposed system: k and δ. Therefore,
several test were conducted to determine the effects of different k and δ values. It
was also necessary some additional testing to determine the accomplishment for
the rest of the requirements defined on Section 3.2.
δ adjustments — Some preliminary test were conducted to determine the
effect of δ value. As explained on the algorithm definition, δ determines how fast
k value increases when all k-elements on a category are the same. With a small δ
the category size should be increased more times until we get different elements in
the category. But with a small δ, the final k value fits best the needs of the data.
With a large δ, category size should be increased less times, but the final k value
should be bigger than the needs of the data.
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Figure 3.4: Effects of δ on time
Figure 3.4 shows that the size of δ does not affect the running time of the proposed
system, hence, this is not a relevant factor to fix a certain δ value. Regarding the
effect of δ on k value during the execution of the anonymization process, Fig-
ure 3.5 depicts that, even though bigger δ values produce slightly bigger final k
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values reached by the system after multiple iterations, the difference obtained is
not significant enough. Due to the fact that a small δ provides a more accurate
final k value and smaller memory consumption without affecting other parame-
ters, we decided to fix δ to 1.2 for the following tests. This leaves k as the only
adjustable parameter of the proposal. As stated on following sections, the system
performance, as well as the user privacy, depend on k.
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Figure 3.5: Effects of δ on final k
Classifier — The proposed classifier cannot be customized in any way; there-
fore, only some functional and utility tests were conducted.
Anonymizer — Privacy, functional and utility tests were conducted for the
anonymizer, all of them with various values of k.
Profiler — The proposed profiler cannot be customized in any way; therefore,
only some functional and utility tests were conducted.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO LIFELOGGING PROTECTION IN STREAMING ENVIRONMENTS 
David Pàmies Estrems 
 
64 Working at the WSE side to generate privacy-preserving user profiles
De-anonymizer — In order to perform detailed privacy tests, some attacks
were simulated using different variations of the de-anonymizer algorithm. In all
these cases, the time field contained in the logs was used to consider the proper
order in which each search query was received. We next detail each variation of
the de-anonymizer element:
• De-anonymizer 1 : This approach tries to retrieve original logs choosing one
random log and one random user from the k-element sets, which the de-
anonymizer recreates, conducting the same operations than the WSE.
• De-anonymizer 2 : This approach does the same than the first version, but
instead of selecting a random user, selects the user who appears more times
in the k-element set linked to a certain category.
• De-anonymizer 3 : This approach has access to the number of queries related
to each category that were sent by this user until that moment. In this way,
from the users who appear in the k-element set linked to a certain category
on a given time, the proposed algorithm selects the user who has sent more
queries related to this category. Therefore, this method makes its decision
taking into account the query history of the respondents instead of just their
temporal appearance in the k-element set linked to a certain category of
interest.
• De-anonymizer 4 : Uses the same approach than in the third version, but
the number of queries related to each category that are obtained from the
query history are multiplied by the number of times that the respondent
appears in the k-element set linked to a certain category. The respondent
with the highest result is then assigned to the current query. This approach
considers the query history but tries to give more weight to the fact that an
individual has sent a certain type of queries recently (which are those stored
in the k-element set).
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3.4.2.3 Test environment
All experiments were performed using a Dell notebook running Ubuntu Linux
14.04 LTS, with a 1.8 GHz Intel CoreTMi7-4500U CPU and 8GB of RAM. Sys-
tem hard disk was a Seagate ST1000LM014, which performance profile is skewed
strongly towards small file I/O, and a below average overall performance. Much
better results could be obtained with a faster hard disk or Solid State Disks (SSD),
that are already installed in many servers nowadays. All algorithms were im-
plemented and executed in Python 2.7.6. MongoDB 3.0.7 was used as No-SQL
database, which was also installed and running on the same computer.
3.4.3 Privacy study
To test the privacy level provided by the new proposal, the original query logs
were compared to the anonymized query logs, counting the percentage of matching
records. Results can be seen on Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6: Matching records
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Figure 3.7: Matching records. De-anonymizer
In this figure, the case A(NR) represents what would happen if the anonymizer
does not increment the corresponding k value when all users stored in certain
category set are the same (this is a special case explained in Section 3.3.4). In
this case, the figure depicts that k remains constant but the output contains non-
anonymized logs. When this special case is covered by means of incrementing k,
better privacy is obtained. Data generated by the anonymizer, A in the figure, do
not contain any matching registers; therefore, full privacy seems to be obtained.
However, all de-anonymizer algorithms described above were used with the ano-
nymized logs in order to try to reconstruct the original log stream. Results can
be seen in Figure 3.6 and, more concretely, Figure 3.7 focuses on the four pro-
posed de-anonymizers. The +T element means that those de-anonymizers use
logs sorted according to time field. In all the tests, all the de-anonymizer versions
performed in a similar way (some differences applies but they are not significant)
and they only were able to recover around 1.89% of original logs with the lowest
k value (best case for the de-anonymizers). As a result of our tests, it can be
concluded that it is quite difficult to link the anonymized logs with their original
users.
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3.4.4 Functional study
We next discuss the level of achievement of the functional requirements defined
previously.
3.4.4.1 Modularity
The proposed system was developed as a set of independent services, forming
a micro-service architecture. It allows to accomplish a low coupling and high
cohesion system. This architecture makes the system more reliable and easy to
maintain. Some services could be changed by existing modules in the WSE, e.g.
a WSE classifier. Other services could optionally be deployed or not depending
on the needs of the WSE. For example, the profiler should be used if the WSE is
willing to create anonymous user profiles but, if the WSE only desires to release
an anonymized log stream, the proposed system would also work without it.
3.4.4.2 Scalability
Thanks to the high modularity of the developed services, it is easy to deploy them
on available idle systems, using the existing WSE infrastructure. Horizontal scala-
bility could be achieved by deploying more than one instance of each service, either
at the same or at different systems. Vertical scalability could be also achieved,
since a faster CPU, disk or some memory dedicated to cache data would increase
significantly the amount of work the system could handle. In lighter loads, modules
will remain idle, consuming an insignificant amount of resources. Most modules
could be closed completely if not used, for example, the classifier and the profiler.
So this system shows a high load scalability.
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3.4.4.3 Speed
Time consumption of WSE processes can be seen in Table 3.2. Even though the
computer used for the tests has 4 cores, only 1 was used in each test. All algorithms
support multi-threading, so better results could be obtained by simply enabling
it.
Table 3.2: Runtime cost
Time/log (µs)
Mean ± SD
Queries/second
(Threads Google)
Classifier 1 503 ± 24.0 665 (60)
Anonymizer 22 ± 0.35 45 454 ( 1)
Profiler 267 ± 4.73 3 745 (11)
The classifier and the profiler do not use k values and, hence, they are not affected
by its variations. In the other hand, the anonymizer uses k, but results do not
change significantly with different k values, as it is reflected by the small standard
deviation.
The classifier was the slowest algorithm, because it has to search in several
databases. We must be aware of two factors that affect its performance: i) the
content of those databases was mainly generated using logs’ content, therefore,
databases only contain log related data; and ii) the majority of the time used by
the classifier corresponds to I/O from disk, hence, a faster disk, or placing the data
in the system’s memory would greatly improve the performance of the classifier.
The same idea could be applied to the profiler, which creates users profiles on a
disk database.
Using as reference the 40 000 queries per second that Google processes on average,
one single thread of the anonymizer in the used test environment can anonymize
all Google queries in real-time. On the other hand, we need 60 classifier threads
and 11 profiler threads to reach real-time performance in our test environment,
but with the discussed changes, those numbers could be lower on a real setting.
For completeness, all de-anonymizer algorithms were also tested. Results can be
seen in Figure 3.8. As expected, algorithms that count the number of times that
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a user appears on a category, are the slowest overall, and more affected when k
increases. Using profiles and choosing the best fit on a category was also affected
by k.
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Figure 3.8: De-anonymizer speed
3.4.4.4 Resource consumption
Table 3.3 shows the achieved results for maximum memory and disk usage at each
process. It’s important to note that de-anonymizer-3 and de-anonymizer-4 keep
basic user profiles in memory, and that is the reason because they consume more
memory. Apart from those two algorithms, the rest should not use more memory,
whatever the amount of logs they deal with.
Regarding the disk space, when output log streams are stored in the disk, they
use exactly the same amount of space than the original log streams. Furthermore,
if the profiler stores queries in a user profile, with 4GiB of test data, it generated
a 3GiB profiles database, with an average record size of 112 bytes. Note that, in
any case, this will depend on the input data.
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Table 3.3: Memory usage
Max. mem (KiB)
Mean ± SD
Classifier 111 581 ± 145
Anonymizer 10 347 ± 72
Profiler 12 120 ± 94
De-anonymizer 1 9 316 ± 640
De-anonymizer 2 9 375 ± 687
De-anonymizer 3 312 273 ± 4 620
De-anonymizer 4 311 782 ± 2 945
3.4.4.5 Transparency
This proposal only needs to read the stream of logs already generated by a WSE,
so it is no necessary to make changes at the existing WSE architecture. The
resulting anonymized log stream has exactly the same structure and size than
the original one. Therefore, this system can be plugged at the end of the current
process followed by the WSE and generate an anonymized output without changing
anything else.
3.4.5 Utility study
This section studies the classifier and the anonymizer in terms of utility. Even
though the classifier obtains a hierarchical categorization for each query, the ano-
nymizer sets are based only on very generic categories. When a query cannot be
classified into any category, the classifier uses Microsoft Bing recommendations to
find alternatives. As a result, the proposed classifier was capable of categorizing
85% of the all the tested queries. In order to verify that this automatic cate-
gorization was working properly, a sample of 1 068 logs were manually classified
and compared to the results of the algorithm. This sample, in our population
of 36 389 576 logs, provides a confidence level of 95%, with a margin of error of
3%. Through this comparison we found 58.99% of logs in a correct category. In
Table 3.4 all used categories can be seen. Those categories correspond to the first
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hierarchical level of ODP. Percentage of correctly classified logs for each category
was also estimated.
Table 3.4: Classification utility
Classification
% Correct
Classification
% Correct
Arts 57.23% Recreation 55.22%
Business 77.39% Reference 69.23%
Computers 64.79% Regional 69.08%
Games 56.25% Science 47.22%
Health 88.10% Shopping 69.64%
Home 81.48% Society 56.76%
Kids and Teens 37.65% Sports 40.48%
News 16.67% World 30.77%
It can be seen that this strategy works better in some categories. For instance,
with categories that contain very specific terms, such as Health, the best results are
obtained. In contrast, worse results are gathered in categories with generic terms,
such as News. This is because the proposed algorithm only selects the word with
lower entropy, which is expected to be the most specific one. Categorization was
solely based on this word. When a combination of words changes the meaning of
the query, this approach led to errors. For example, in the query “artic monkeys”,
the lowest entropy word is “artic”. This word is categorized as “Regional: Polar
Regions”. That is correct for the word itself but using the whole context, category
should be “Arts: Music”. These results show that a better classifier should only be
obtained by means of applying more complex natural language processing systems;
however, this is outside of the scope of this proposal.
In addition to that, to check the anonymizer’s utility, two sets of user profiles were
created using the profiler. The first set contained profiles created with original logs
while the second set contained profiles created with anonymized logs. Both sets
were compared in order to check whether they were equivalent. It was confirmed
that, for a given user, both sets of profiles contained the same number of queries for
each category. We argue that if an anonymized profile contains the same categories
with the same weights than an original profile, it implies that the anonymized
profile retains the same utility than the original one.
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3.5 Conclusions
This chapter has presented a novel framework for anonymizing query logs gener-
ated by WSEs. Privacy guarantee is defined in terms of set theory, which relates
sets of users to sets of query logs. Data could be released without other modifi-
cations than removing direct identifiers from query text and remapping between
those two sets. This contrasts to existing approaches that release heavily modified
data, either distorted or generalized, to maintain anonymity.
In our evaluation, we have considered the worst-case scenario, in which an attacker
who is willing to use the anonymized query logs to retrieve the original query logs
has gained access to the same base information and algorithms than the WSE. We
conducted tests under this context and the best attempt to recover the original logs
only obtained a 1.89% of them. All the proposed methods were tested using the
AOL released logs; therefore, we argue that our solution is capable of dealing with
real data in a real setup. In this way, we have considered also the average Google’s
load to study the runtime cost and the memory usage. The query log’s utility
after its anonymization was also analyzed, and the results showed that original
query logs and anonymized query logs were equivalent in terms of categories being
reflected.
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Chapter 4
A Real-Time Query Log
Protection Method for Web
Search Engines
4.1 Introduction
As previously discussed, query logs are fundamental for the proper operation of
several services offered over the Internet, but also can lead to some severe problems,
related to users’ privacy. In the last chapter, we obtained query logs with high
degree of privacy using a statistical de-identification approach. Our proposal was
able to process a stream of query logs in real time and generate anonymized logs
with similar queries from disctinct users.
In this chapter, we want to improve the previously proposed system. We assume
WSEs are seeking to monetize query logs by making them available to third parties,
while respecting privacy regulations [38]. In order to make data monetization
viable, one also must keep in mind that reducing privacy disclosure risk is not
enough. At the same time, as much data utility as possible should be preserved.
In the previous chapter, query logs were classified using broad categories, which
caused a certain degree of utility loss.
73
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We reason some modifications over the previous approach to achieve a system
with customizable data utility, in addition to the proposed use of probabilistic
k-anonymity to bound disclosure risk of personally identifiable user attributes.
Therefore, the present chapter expands our previous proposal to use parameter-
izable levels of categorization. We seek to enable the WSE to adjust utility of
generated logs according to the needs of each application. We will also validate
the proposal to prove that it is able to achieve the same or better level of pri-
vacy than previously reported, with an improved overall data utility. Formal and
experimental proofs will be devised to ensure its feasibility.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 presents our proposal.
Section 4.3 provides architectural components and requirements. Section 4.4 pro-
vides experimentation results validating our approach. Section 4.5 concludes the
chapter.
4.2 Our Proposal
We present in this section our anonymization proposal. Table 4.1 introduces the
notation used along this section. Next, we provide a formal definition of the
expected data we aim to anonymize, the way how the data is structured, a formal
analysis about the privacy properties of the proposal, and the algorithmic version
of our anonymization process.
4.2.1 Data Structures
We assume a stream of query logs, formed by m registers, where rm corresponds
to the last received query log:
R = {r0, .., rm} (4.1)
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO LIFELOGGING PROTECTION IN STREAMING ENVIRONMENTS 
David Pàmies Estrems 
 
4.2. Our Proposal 75
Table 4.1: Notations used in this chapter.
R : Stream of query logs
rj : Individual query log
ui : User unique identifier
qj : Individual query text
cq : Full individual query classification
τ : Hierarchical ontology of categories
V : Set of vertices
vhx : Vertex at depth h depth and width x
E : Set of edges
ef : Edge between two vertices
Qhx : Set of queries for vertex v
h
x
Uhx : Set of users for vertex v
h
x
γhx : Category for vertex v
h
x
τ ∗`,k : τ with a depth ` and width k
Each register is of the form:
rj = {ui, qj, cg} (4.2)
where ui is a unique identifier that represents the user who sent the query qj to
the WSE. Each query qj is composed of a set of unstructured terms, which we
previously provided to a categorizer (cf. Section 4.3) to obtain the classification
of the query, denoted as cg. This classification cg is represented as the path from
a general category γ1s to a more specific category γ
h
s∗ , with the form:
cg = {γ1s , γ2s′ , ..., γhs∗} (4.3)
The path is created according to a hierarchical ontology structure by means of a
tree structure τ , which is formed by a set of edges ef ∈ E and vertices vhx ∈ V ,
where h is the depth and x the width. Each vertex vhx of τ represents a category
γhx , and is related to other categories through the edges. The vertices or categories
are more generic the closer they are to the roots {v11...v1x}, and more specific the
closer to the leaves. Thus, every query is classified by assigning it to one of the
vertices of the tree. As mentioned, the classification is the path between the root
and the vertex, and it is composed by all the γ categories of the nodes that are in
the path.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO LIFELOGGING PROTECTION IN STREAMING ENVIRONMENTS 
David Pàmies Estrems 
 
76 A Real-Time Query Log Protection Method for Web Search Engines
τ =< V,E > (4.4)
V = {v11, ..., v`z}
E = {e1, ..., eg}
vhx = {Uhx , Qhx, γhx}
ef = {vhx , vh+1x′ }
The maximum depth of the hierarchy τ is `max, defined as the distance or minimum
path between the root and its farthest leaf. The number of terms or depth for
each classification may be `max or lower, but we will use limited versions at depths
up to `, where ` goes from 1 to `max.
Each vertex vhx contains a set of users U
h
x , and a set of queries Q
m
n . The size of
Umn will be k, but the size of Q
h
x may be larger. This is because U is defined using
arity, but Q is defined without the need of using arity.
max | Uhx | = k (4.5)
max | Qhx | ≥ k (4.6)
Therefore, we call τ ∗`,k the tree τ with a depth ` and a value of |U | = k.
4.2.2 Restrictions
To properly explain why Uhx and Q
h
x may have different size, we introduce two
additional restrictions that we impose to our proposal (cf. Restrictions 4.1 to 4.2).
Restriction 4.1. A given query associated to an anonymized log must not be
assigned to the same user that issued the query on the unanonymized log.
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Restriction 4.2. When creating an anonymized query log, user must be selected
randomly between at least k different user values.
Restriction 4.1 ensures that outputs do not contain unanonymized pairs of user
and query. Restriction 4.2 imposes probabilistic k-anonymity, setting at least k
distinct values for users in each category when randomly creating an anonymized
log.
4.2.3 Anonymization Process
We define our anonymization process as the method that generates the probabilis-
tic k-anonymous stream of logs R′:
R′ = {r′0, ..., r′m} (4.7)
We assume that each record rj = {ui, qj, cg} in R is assigned to the corresponding
vhx using its categorization cg. The record rj is then separated in two parts: ui
which is assigned to Uhx , and qj which is assigned to Q
h
x. Records in R
′ are obtained
by applying a random match between one element of Uhx and one element of Q
h
x,
once | Uhx |= k:
r′j = {u′i, qj, cg} (4.8)
where qj ∈ Qhx is matched with a u′i ∈ Uhx 6= ui.
The Id function is assumed to be a correct identification function, which given r′j
responds with the original ui. The function Re is a re-identification function used
over the records in R′, which given a r′j responds with:
Re(r′j) = ui ∈ Uhx , uj 6= u′i (4.9)
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The goal of probabilistic k-anonymity is to limit the probability of performing the
right re-identification to at most 1
k
for all ui ∈ R and for all the values of Re(r′j):
P (Re(r′j) = Id(r
′
j)) ≤
1
k
(4.10)
The stream of logs R′ is said to satisfy probabilistic k-anonymity if, by knowing
R′ and the anonymization process, the probability to link any record r′j ∈ R′ and
its corresponding record rj ∈ R is, at most, 1k .
We show next that our proposal satisfies the property defined in Eq. (4.10). For
each vertex vhx of τ , the random selection of an element (Restriction 4.2) guaran-
tees that all outcomes are equally likely to be selected. Therefore, we can state
maximum probability of re-identification of a r′j over τ using:
P (Re(r′j) = Id(r
′
j)) ≤ max∀x,h
|Uhx ∩ Id(r′j)|
|Uhx |
(4.11)
As Uhx sets are defined using arity, we know that:
∀x, h, Id(r′j)→ |Uhx ∩ Id(r′j)| ∈ 0, 1 (4.12)
Someone could argue that Restriction 4.1 leads to a value of k − 1. However,
since Restriction 4.2 establishes this value to k (Restriction 4.2 also assures that
|Uhx | ≥ k), the upper bound of our proposal for P (Re(r′j) = Id(r′j)) is strictly lower
or equal to 1
k
, hence satisfying probabilistic k-anonymity. A more formal analysis
about this result is provided next.
4.2.4 Privacy Analysis
Given k (anonymity parameter) in Z+, a set of users U equal to u1, ..., un (such
that n ≥ k), a set of query logsQ equal to (uij , qj)jj=1 up to the processing iteration
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j, where qk 6= ql ∀k, l ∈ [j], (k 6= l), uij ∈ U . We also assume that users repeat
(i.e. uik = uil).
We assume that given a query in R′, the whole R′ and k, an arbitrary PPT
(Probabilistic Polynomial-Time) adversary A has at most 1
k
chance of guessing
the user the given query was attached to in R.
Now, with the notation above, and let j0 ∈ [j] define and experiment ExpRe(k,R),
in which:
R′ ← Anon(k,R) (4.13)
R∗ ← Re(k,R′)
let b =
1, if R = R
∗
0, otherwise
return b
Theorem 1. Anon (cf. Eq.(4.13)) is probabilistic k-anonymous if, for every user
set, for every query log R and every index j0 ∈ [j], any PPT adversary A has a
bounded advantage up to 1
k
, i.e.,
AdvA(k,R) = (4.14)
P [ExpRe(k,R)] ≤ 1
k
Proof. Let R′ = (u′ij , q
′
j)
j′
j=1 and j the iteration at which the first log entry is
released by the anonymizer after (u, q) has been read by itself. Let UR′j =
(uij1 , ..., uiJ ) be the users presents at R
′ at iteration j and Uj = (ui1 , ..., uik) be the
user set used internally in the anonymizer at iteration j (i.e., we know u ∈ Uj ∈ UR′j
and Uj has at least k different users).
P (A(R′, q) = u) =∑
u′∈U
P (A(R′, q) = u|(u′, q) ∈ R) · P ((u′, q) ∈ R)
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If Uj and Qj are the users and queries stored by the anonymizer after reading
query q, where Uj has at least k different users, permute users from the queries of
Qj to R (all in Uj) has no effect on the anonymizer output, i.e.:
P (A(R′, q) = u|R = Re(R′)) =∑
u∈Uj
P (A(R′, q) = u|[R = Re(R′)] ∩ [Uj = U ]) · P (Uj = U)
where Uj contains the users that can appear in step j, hence u ∈ U . If Uj is fixed
and u ∈ Uj, we can consider an R where the query q is paired with each of the
users u′ of Uj, and one of the queries q′ whence the entries of u′ from Uj are now
paired with U .
If we have read ju times the user u, ∀i : ji ≥ 1, we obtain that the ratio of R∗s,
being R∗ = Re(R′) and Uj = U , which contain the original pair (u, q) is:
P (A(R′, q) = u|R = Re(R′)) =
(ju2 + ...+ juk + ju−1)!
(ju2 + ...+ juk + ju)!
=
1
(ju2 + ...+ juk + ju)
≤ 1
k
hence satisfying Theorem 1.
4.2.5 Algorithmic Version of our Proposal
An algorithmic version of our anonymization process is presented in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 5 presents the anonymization process counterpart, assumed to be im-
plemented by a PPT adversary. Algorithm 4 receives three main inputs: desired
k, ` values, and R as a stream of hierarchically categorized query logs.
Even if all the sets are initialized empty, our proposed algorithm guarantees that
Uhx is of size k every time a new anonymized log is generated from that category.
It also tries to keep the Qhx size as close as possible to the k value. As it always
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO LIFELOGGING PROTECTION IN STREAMING ENVIRONMENTS 
David Pàmies Estrems 
 
4.2. Our Proposal 81
chooses between k different users and at least k different queries, probabilistic
k-anonymity is guaranteed.
Qhx size may be bigger than k in the following situation: each time a new log enters
a category and the log’s user was already present on that category, user’s arity
is increased by one in Uhx and the query is added to Q
h
x. Therefore, |Uhx | stays
the same but |Qhx| is increased by one. If Restriction 4.2 is not met, there is no
anonymized log release (i.e., the size of Qhx can be bigger than k).
If Restriction 4.2 is met, and some user’s arity is greater than one, then Algorithm 4
releases an additional log to reduce the size of Q and user arity, also enforcing
Restriction 4.1. This extra step is only done once per log, therefore at most two
logs are generated each time a new record enters the category, until all users’
arities are equal to one.
Algorithm 4: Anonymization Process
Input : R, k, `
Output: R’
1 foreach rj ∈ R do
2 // Get current user, query text and full query categorization
3 u, q, c← rj;
4 // Truncate categorization to level `
5 cat← {γ1s , ..., γ`s∗} ∈ c;
6 // Add current user to users’ category set
7 users[cat]← u;
8 // Add current query and full categorization to queries’ category set
9 query[cat]← {q, c};
10 // While there are more than k distinct users on the current category
11 while distinct(users[cat]) > k do
12 // Select and remove a random query and categorization from the
category’s set
13 pop random {q′, c′} ∈ query[cat];
14 // Select and remove a random user from the category’s set, distinct from
the original user related to the query
15 pop random u′ ∈ users[cat], u′ 6= Id(q);
16 // Send to the output the selected user, query and category
17 send u′, q′, c′;
18 end
19 end
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Algorithm 5: De-Anonymization Process
Input : R’, k, `
Output: R*
1 foreach r′j ∈ R′ do
2 // Get current user, query text and full query categorization
3 u, q, c← r′j;
4 // Truncate categorization to level `
5 cat← {γ1s , ..., γ`s∗} ∈ c;
6 // Add current user to users’ category set
7 users[cat]← u;
8 // Add current query and full categorization to queries’ category set
9 query[cat]← {q, c};
10 // While there are more than k distinct users on the current category
11 while distinct(users[cat]) > k do
12 // Select and remove a query and categorization from the category’s set,
using one of the record linkage algorithms
13 record linkage {q′, c′} ∈ query[cat];
14 // Select and remove a user from the category’s set, using one of the
record linkage algorithms
15 record linkage u ∈ users[cat];
16 // Send to the output the selected user, query and category
17 send u, q, c;
18 end
19 end
System performance remains stable whenever variations of the set size is propor-
tionally conducted (cf. Chapter 3). Hence, we modify the size of each set in
incremental unitary steps. This allows the most efficient memory usage. In addi-
tion to the k parameter, the depth of categories’ tree must be specified using the `
parameter. Both k and ` remain fixed to the specified value throughout the entire
execution.
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 depicts an example using k = 2 and ` = 1. These values
have been chosen to facilitate the understanding of the example, but they are
inferior to desirable values in a real application of the algorithm (cf. Section
4.4). The example starts with an empty system, receiving a stream R of query
logs classified in two distinct categories. Figure 4.1 depicts the used R, and the
contents of τ and R’ at the end of the aforementioned example. Figure 4.2 depicts
the deanonymization counterpart, leading to faulty re-identification.
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STEP 1: first query arrives
INPUT: r1{u=Alice, q=”piano”, c=Arts/Music}
users[Arts] = Alice
query[Arts] = ”piano”
STEP 2: second query goes to a new category
INPUT: r2{u=Bob, q=”myspace”, c=Computers/Internet}
users[Arts] = Alice
query[Arts] = ”piano”
users[Computers] = Bob
query[Computers] = ”myspace”
STEP 3, 4: still no distinct users > k in any category
INPUT: r3{u=Alice, q=”guitar”, c=Arts/Music}
INPUT: r4{u=Charlie, q=”violin”, c=Arts/Music}
users[Arts] = Alice, Alice, Charlie
query[Arts] = ”piano”, ”guitar”, ”violin”
users[Computers] = Bob
query[Computers] = ”myspace”
STEP 5: distinct users > k in ”Arts”, but k after the first output
INPUT: r5{u=Bob, q=”flute”, c=Arts/Music}
users[Arts] = Alice, Alice, Charlie, Bob
query[Arts] = ”piano”, ”guitar”, ”violin”, ”flute”
users[Computers] = Bob
query[Computers] = ”myspace”
Category full: distinct(users[Arts]) = 3 > k
OUTPUT: r′1{u=Charlie, q=”piano”, c=Arts/Music}
users[Arts] = Alice, Alice, Bob
query[Arts] = ”guitar”, ”violin”, ”flute”
users[Computers] = Bob
query[Computers] = ”myspace”
Table 4.2: Applying Algorithm 4 with k=2 and `=1 (Part I)
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STEP 6: new query, but no disctinct users > k in any category
INPUT: r6{u=Charlie, q=”google”, c=Computers/Internet}
users[Arts] = Alice, Alice, Bob
query[Arts] = ”guitar”, ”violin”, ”flute”
users[Computers] = Bob, Charlie
query[Computers] = ”myspace”, ”google”
STEP 7: distinct users > k in ”Computers”
INPUT: r7{u=Alice, q=”aol”, c=Computers/Internet}
users[Arts] = Alice, Alice, Bob
query[Arts] = ”guitar”, ”violin”, ”flute”
users[Computers] = Bob, Charlie, Alice
query[Computers] = ”myspace”, ”google”, ”aol”
Category full: distinct(users[Computers]) = 3 > k
OUTPUT: r′2{u=Bob, q=”google”, c=Computers/Internet}
users[Arts] = Alice, Alice, Bob
query[Arts] = ”guitar”, ”violin”, ”flute”
users[Computers] = Charlie, Alice
query[Computers] = ”myspace”, ”aol”
STEP 8: distinct users > k in ”Arts”; k after the second output
INPUT: r8{u=Charlie, q=”drums”, c=Arts/Music}
users[Arts] = Alice, Alice, Bob, Charlie
query[Arts] = ”guitar”, ”violin”, ”flute”, ”drums”
users[Computers] = Charlie, Alice
query[Computers] = ”myspace”, ”aol”
Category full: distinct(users[Arts]) = 3 > k
OUTPUT: r′3{u=Alice, q=”drums”, c=Arts/Music}
Category full: distinct(users[Arts]) = 3 > k
OUTPUT: r′4{u=Bob, q=”guitar”, c=Arts/Music}
users[Arts] = Alice, Charlie
query[Arts] = ”violin”, ”flute”
users[Computers] = Charlie, Alice
query[Computers] = ”myspace”, ”aol”
Table 4.3: Applying Algorithm 4 with k=2 and `=1 (Part II)
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r
1
Alice piano Arts/Music
r
2
Bob myspace Computers/Internet
r
3
Alice guitar Arts/Music
r
4
Charlie violin Arts/Music
r
5
Bob flute Arts/Music
r
6
Charlie google Computers/Internet
r
7
Alice aol Computers/Internet
r
8
Charlie drums Arts/Music
r’
1
Charlie piano Arts/Music
r’
2
Bob google Computers/Internet
r’
3
Alice drums Arts/Music
r’
4
Bob guitar Arts/Music
Arts
U Q
Alice
Charlie
violin
flute
Computers
U Q
Charlie
Alice
myspace
aol
R
R’
Figure 4.1: Contents of R, τ and R′ in the example provided in Tables 4.2,4.3.
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Charlie piano Arts/Music
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Bob guitar Arts/Music
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Computers
U Q
Bob google
R’
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1
Bob drums Arts/Music
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’
Figure 4.2: Contents of τ ′ and R∗ when trying to deanonymize R′ from the
example provided in Tables 4.2,4.3
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4.3 Practical Implementation
We present in this section a practical implementation of our proposal. We de-
scribe the architecture and requirements, before moving to the presentation of the
experimental results.
4.3.1 Initial Architecture
We aim at implementing an anonymization method that can be used by Web
Search Engines (WSEs) to anonymize query logs in a streaming environment, and
at server-side (cf. Figure 4.3). The input data of the anonymization algorithm
is a continuous stream of categorized query logs. The outputs are a continuous
stream of anonymized logs and a database of user profiles. To meet the goals
of our proposal, we must ensure that those outputs meet a set of requirements
detailed below.
WSE
Anonymizer
Query
logs
Anonymized
logs
Profiles
Figure 4.3: Our proposal defines a WSE query logs anonymization method in
a streaming environment. The input of the algorithm is a stream of query logs.
The outputs are a stream of anonymized logs and a database of user profiles.
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4.3.2 Functional Requirements
In addition to the restrictions and properties already defined in Section 4.2, we
report next some functional requirements for the practical implementation of our
proposal.
Scalability — It refers to the capability of a system to handle a growing amount
of work, or its potential to be enlarged in order to accommodate that growth [149].
In our system, the objective is to achieve load scalability, defined as the ability
to accommodate heavier or lighter loads. Those methods can be classified in two
main categories [150]:
• Horizontal Scalability is related to the ability of a system to add more
working nodes, such as a new computer. Hundreds of small computers may
be configured in a cluster to obtain aggregate computing power. This ap-
proach demands an architecture that allows efficient management and main-
tenance of multiple nodes.
• Vertical Scalability is related to the ability of adding resources to a sin-
gle node in a system, typically involving the addition of CPUs or memory.
Such approach could be interesting in a virtualized environment, as it could
provide more resources according to the virtual node needs. This approach
demands an architecture that allows efficient management of used processes
and memory.
The two models have their own particular benefits and limitations. If necessary,
our proposal should use all possible assets. In such a case, the design should be
integrated into existing systems on a WSE architecture. Ideally, our system can
take advantage of underused resources.
Resource Consumption — In order to take advantage of underused resources on
existing architectures, and minimize system deployment costs, we want a minimal
resource consumption. If the designed system is able to use a limited amount of
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resources, all necessary data could be kept and processed in memory, obtaining
better execution times.
Speed — We need a fast processing speed to be able to process all received logs
in real time. Otherwise, some kind of memory buffer will be necessary to keep
incoming logs until processed. That buffer will increment our resource consump-
tion. An additional requirement, in terms of processing speed, must be defined
and only use small buffers at specific overload times. Nowadays, a WSE receives
millions of user queries each hour. Therefore, our system should handle that load,
to be able to integrate it in a existing WSE architecture.
Efficiency — Beyond reduced resource consumption and fast processing time, we
aim at assuring the algorithmic efficiency of the proposal. We consider that this
requirement will be achieved if the algorithmic time complexity of our proposal is
linear according to the inputs.
Transparency — We want a straightforward integration of our approach into an
existing architecture. Having a transparent system implies that no component of
the existing WSE should be modified. For this purpose, our module is expected to
be encapsulated within the WSE. It should also be able to interact to the existing
interfaces of the WSE, without forcing any changes. It should also be able to
generate anonymized logs, while complying with all the previous requirements.
Modularity — We want to have low coupling and high cohesion to achieve a fully
transparent component. Modularity has the added benefit that modifications to
the proposal could be implemented with minimal effort, as well as to carry out
tests with different alternatives for the treatment of the data.
4.3.3 Expanded Architecture
The initial proposal depicted in Figure 4.3 is expanded with two additional parts:
Attacker and Researcher. This allows a proper empirical evaluation, in addition
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to the analysis conducted in Section 4.2. The proposed system is designed using
a micro-service architecture pattern as presented in Figure 4.4. For the current
study, all the defined systems are used. In a real WSE environment, only the parts
marked as WSE should be deployed.
Within the expanded architecture, we find two main components: anonymizer and
profiler. The anonymizer is a component implementing Algorithm 4. The profiler
creates protected user profiles, using the categories of each log assigned to that
user by the anonymizer. Those categories are added to a user profile database in
real-time. Each profile on the database contains a frequency distribution of those
categories queried by the user. They can be seen as user interests that could be
released to third parties, for profit.
WSE
CPX Proves 
d'esforç
 
WSE
Anonymizer
Query
logs
Anonymized
logs
Profiles
Profiles'
Query
logs'
CPX Proves 
d'esforç
 
De-
Anonymizer
CPX Proves 
d'esforç
 
Profile
matcher
Profile
utility
Researcher
Attacker
Figure 4.4: Full Architecture: WSE Anonymizer takes a stream of query logs
and anonymizes them, also generating a database of user profiles. It imple-
ments Algorithm 4 (cf. Section 4.2). De-anonymizer implements Algorithm 5
and simulates adversarial actions over the anonymized logs. It tries to recreate
the original logs and user profiles. Profile matcher, responsible of benchmark-
ing anonymization, de-anonymization and performance, also generates a profile
utility metric.
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4.3.3.1 Actors
Three actors are defined in our current test architecture:
• WSE — has the responsibility of query logs anonymization and publication.
• Attacker — has access to the anonymized stream of logs, tries to recover
the original relationship between the log and the user who made the original
query.
• Researcher — can check all the data, but can not modify anything, to test
the validity of the proposal.
4.3.3.2 Phases
Our study is divided into three main phases:
• Anonymization and profile creation — this phase represents the normal
execution of the system on the WSE environment. It takes the query logs
generated and anonymizes them, also generating a database of user profiles.
• De-anonymization — it simulates attacks, trying to link as much of the
anonymized logs with the user that originally made the query.
• Analysis — it conducts anonymization, de-anonymization and performance
benchmarking, taking into account original and generated data, time and
resource usage.
4.3.3.3 Interactions
In a real WSE environment, the WSE will anonymize the query logs and release the
anonymized ones to its clients as the main interaction. In our tests, the attacker
is acting as a normal client from the WSE point of view. The attacker process
the anonymized output of the WSE and generates another log stream, trying to
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reconstruct original query logs. Only during the tests, secondary interactions occur
between those actors and the researcher, who receives original, anonymized and
de-anonymized query logs. Some further information about it is presented in the
sequel.
4.4 Experimental Results
We report in this section a practical implementation of our approach, and report
experimental tests and results, to validate our approach in terms of privacy, data
utility and other functional requirements.
Experiments were conducted using a Dell notebook running Ubuntu Linux 16.04
LTS, with a 1.8 GHz Intel CoreTMi7-4500U CPU and 8GB of RAM. System hard
disk was a Seagate ST1000LM014, whose performance profile is skewed strongly
towards small file I/O, and a below average overall performance. All algorithms
were implemented and executed in Python 2.7.12.
4.4.1 Implementation
Algorithm 4, described in Section 4.2, has been implemented using the Python
language. Input query logs used to test our system were downloaded from the
public available AOL log repository, in form of plain text files. In order to respect
our transparency functional requirement, we chose to make this file the main input
of our system. However, other methods to feed logs to the system, such as a real
time input via sockets, could be used. The same applies to system output and
we also decided to store them in plain text files, preserving original logs’ format.
Additionally, a No-SQL database was used to store generated user profiles.
Because AOL’s released files do not have any classification, they need to be cat-
egorized by an external categorizer before any of the proposed algorithms could
be applied. We used a modified version of the deterministic classifier proposed in
Chapter 3. The use of a deterministic classifier guarantees that the same query
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will always provide the same unique category. In case a query triggers multiple
categories, the classifier will always take the most probable one. Other families of
classifiers can be adapted and integrated in our approach thanks to the proposed
micro-service architecture. Classifier modifications allow us to obtain a query cat-
egorization organized in several hierarchical levels. Some queries contain letters
or symbols without any meaning, and some contain no text at all. Our classifier
was not able to resolve those logs, and they were left out of data used to test the
proposal. However, some changes made to natural language processing algorithms
on the classifier lead to categorize 98% of original logs, an improvement of over
the 85% categorized in Chapter 3. As it is out of the scope of the current proposal,
implementation of the classifier will not be evaluated. Priority will be given to
allow interoperability between our proposal and different classifiers. Usually, clas-
sification process needs more specific data, related to WSE environment or desired
output categories. Thus, we leave freedom to each WSE to choose the strategy
that best suits their needs.
We also validate the possible record linkage of the anonymized stream, imple-
menting three different record linkage algorithms, and evaluate for each algorithm
whose requirements are fulfilled. In addition, some other changes that have been
made to the initial architecture described in Section 4.3 are discussed below.
4.4.2 Evaluation Methodology
The algorithmic solution proposed in Section 4.2, and all the architectural compo-
nents, requirements and implementation details defined in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.1,
have been used to conduct an experimental evaluation and comparison to previ-
ous work in Chapter 3. In particular, one version of the anonymizer, and three
versions of the de-anonymizer are implemented and evaluated in terms of utility,
privacy and functional requirements.
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4.4.2.1 Experimental Datasets
For our experiments, we use plain datasets (i.e., text files), containing query logs
released by AOL [151]. The released AOL data contains up to thirty six million
(36 389 576) query logs. Such query logs correspond to a three-month period of
real web search activity conducted by AOL users, and released by AOL for research
purposes. Figure 4.5 provides a brief sample of the used logs.
116874 thompson water seal 2006 -05 -24 11:31:36 1 www.thompsonswaterseal.com
116874 express -scripts 2006 -05 -30 07:56:03 1 www.express -scripts.com
116874 express -scripts 2006 -05 -30 07:56:03 2 member.express -scripts.com
116874 knbt 2006 -05 -31 07:57:28
116874 knbt.com 2006 -05 -31 08:09:30 1 www.knbt.com
117020 naughty thoughts 2006 -03 -01 08:33:07 2 www.naughtythoughts.com
117020 really eighteen 2006 -03 -01 15:49:55 2 www.reallyeighteen.com
117020 texas penal code 2006 -03 -03 17:57:38 1 www.capitol.state.tx.us
117020 hooks texas 2006 -03 -08 09:47:08
117020 homicide hooks texas 2006 -03 -08 09:47:35
117020 homicide bowie county 2006 -03 -08 09:48:25 6 www.tdcj.state.tx.us
117020 texarkana gazette 2006 -03 -08 09:50:20 1 www.texarkanagazette.com
117020 tdcj 2006 -03 -08 09:52:36 1 www.tdcj.state.tx.us
117020 naughty thoughts 2006 -03 -11 00:04:40 1 www.naughtythoughts.com
117020 cupid.com 2006 -03 -11 00:08:50
Figure 4.5: AOL log format. Each row represents a query log. Columns
contain, from left to right: user identifier, query submitted, time submitted,
result selected and result URL.
The Classifier (cf. Section 4.4.1), adds to each log record an additional column
with a hierarchical classification in form of a list with n elements. In our case,
n was between one and 13, and each element of the list represents a subcategory
of the previous element. This classification is generated independently of the
anonymizer. Therefore, this list contains all the subcategories which the Classifier
is able to generate for a given query, regardless of the ` used by the anonymization
process.
4.4.2.2 Conducted Tests
Proposed system could be configured using two parameters: k and `, being k the
desired number of different users on each category and ` the maximum depth of
categories and subcategories used for each record. Several tests were conducted to
determine its effects.
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Anonymizer To generate anonymized data, proposed anonymizer was exe-
cuted on all available AOL logs multiple times, to cover different k and ` values.
k has taken values between 3 and 200 to be able to compare obtained results with
previous ones in Chapter 3. To do this, Algorithm 4 needs to be tested at least
using ` = 1. We decided to test all available ` values, that with our classification
correspond to values between one and 13, but we found that from 11 onwards,
differences were not significant: few logs have more than 11 categories of depth.
Our privacy, functional and utility requirements are checked for every combination
of k and `.
Profiler Specific tests were conducted with the profiler, to determine the
amount of data utility that could be lost with anonymized profiles creation re-
spect to unanonymized profiles. For those tests, we used k values between three
and 90 and ` values between one and 13.
De-anonymizer A de-anonymization has been attempted against all anony-
mized data. All anonymized data was tested against three different record-linkage
algorithms:
• Record-linkage 1 — This is the simplest record-linkage algorithm we
tested. It tries to apply an inverse transformation to anonymized query
logs by applying a similar algorithm to the one used in the anonymization
process (cf. Algorithm 4 in Section 4.2). In short, it tries to recreate orig-
inal logs by randomly matching users and queries from the same category.
Attacker also takes advantage of both restrictions 4.1, 4.2 to achieve higher
levels of de-anonymization.
• Record-linkage 2 — It improves the performance over Record-linkage 1.
Instead of randomly matching users and queries, it assigns the user that
appears more times on a category to the selected query. Just like other
algorithms, both restrictions are respected.
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• Record-linkage 3 — It keeps track of how many times a user issued a
query on each category, constantly updating a simplified user profile. When
the algorithm needs to assign a user to a query, the user with more issued
queries on that category will be chosen. If a user appears more than one
time, the result will be multiplied by the number of appearances of that
user, balancing the importance between current state of the system and
historical values.
4.4.3 Privacy Study
Our privacy test compares original query logs data with the anonymized ones.
Results for this base case show that none of the original pairs of user/query appear
on the anonymized query log. Notwithstanding, that result did not guarantee full
user privacy, since some attacks are possible over the output data flow, and some
user logs may be re-identified. Three different record-linkage algorithms were
applied to the anonymized query logs (cf. Algorithm 5). Resulting logs were
compared to the original ones, counting the percentage of matching records.
Our de-anonymization algorithms proposal is based on Algorithm 5, that is similar
to Algorithm 4 used in anonymization. It uses the stream of anonymized logs
generated by the WSE as the main input. It also needs k and ` parameters
(explained in Section 4.2). The smaller the difference between k and ` values used
in both algorithms, the better the results obtained from de-anonymization. In
other words, the attacker will be able to re-identify the original data more easily.
The stream of anonymized logs is classified in the same way as the original one,
since we assume that categorization is public and the attacker can use it. There-
fore, the de-anonymization process uses the same categorization, which enables
this algorithm to obtain the best de-anonymization rate when trying to recover
the original logs.
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The main difference with the anonymizer algorithm is the use of record linkage
function, different for each implementation of the de-anonymizer algorithms. The
most complex de-anonymizers also use additional data structures to improve de-
anonymization performance. Differences of each algorithm are fully explained in
Section 4.4.2.2.
For analysis purposes, we need to evaluate the amount of memory and time used in
each algorithm execution, therefore, previous algorithms were modified to calculate
those values. An additional algorithm must be defined to find the number of logs
that are identical comparing two log streams.
Figure 4.6 shows percentage of matching records, executing the three algorithms
with values of k between three and 200 and values of ` between one and 13. With
` = 1, only one level of the tree structure was used, which results in a data
structure equivalent to the one used in Chapter 3. ` = 13 is the maximum depth
that our classifier was able to generate. Thus, there is no need to use higher `
values. We also picked out k values to be able to compare results between our
current and former evaluation.
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Figure 4.6: Record linkage (%). Percentage of matching records, executing
the three de-anonymization algorithms with values of k between three and 200
and values of ` between one and 13.
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In all cases, results are under the theoretical maximum probability 1
k
of being
re-identified [152]. We ran the Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit statistical
test [153, 154] to compare the k-anonymity probability with the experimental re-
sults, Figure 4.7. The maximum difference between the cumulative distributions,
D, is 0.08 with a corresponding p-value of 0.9977. Therefore, the statistical test
yields to acceptance of the null hypothesis that our results follow k-anonymity’s
probability of re-identification (at the 5% level of significance).
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0 10 20 30
Match (%)
Cu
m
u
la
tiv
e
 F
ra
ct
io
n 
(k)
Figure 4.7: Comparison between cumulative fraction functions of the the-
oretical k-anonymity (dashed) and experimental results (solid). Used for the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (D = 0.08, p-value= 0.9977).
Each record-linkage version improves re-identification rate, being the third version
the one that obtains better results overall. k value was highly correlated with
privacy, because when the value of k increases, record linkage decreases. ` also
affects privacy. With a higher number of levels (high ` value) users were matched
with more specific queries, therefore, it was also more probable to obtain a correct
re-identification of the original user. Here, we face a trade-off between privacy and
data utility.
Results obtained this way, are close to the ones obtained in our previous article
using the proposed algorithm without restriction, since now the effective size of
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the category sets are closer to the k value specified as a parameter. However, on
average a better anonymization is obtained, since the size of Q must be temporarily
increased to meet the restrictions 4.1 and 4.2.
Figure 4.8 shows mean final | Q | values, related to ` and initial k value. For low `
values, mean final | Q | values are higher because they have less categories results
and more user coincidences on the same category. However, with small k and `
values, the high number of queries that passes through each category counter this
effect. With higher ` values, final | Q | values tend to match up with specified k.
|Q
|
Figure 4.8: Final | Q |-value. For low ` values, final | Q | is higher due to
more user coincidences on the same category. With higher ` values, final | Q |
tend to match the specified k.
The highest record linkage is obtained with highest ` and lowest k values. Our
best de-anonymizer algorithm was able to link 23.18% records to the original user.
De-anonymization tests were conducted knowing exactly all algorithms, categories
and variables used for anonymization. This ratio decreases quickly when initial k
value is increased, obtaining a record linkage lower than 1% from k values greater
than 90. In conclusion, desired record linkage level could be adjusted by modifying
the k value, even offsetting the effect of ` variations on the record linkage.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO LIFELOGGING PROTECTION IN STREAMING ENVIRONMENTS 
David Pàmies Estrems 
 
100 A Real-Time Query Log Protection Method for Web Search Engines
4.4.4 Utility Study
We proceed to analyze the utility of the proposed anonymizer. This analysis has
been focused on two different aspects:
• Percentage of logs that the system can generate as an output.
• Preservation of original user’s interest in anonymized user’s profiles.
First, we want to analyze the percentage of logs that can be generated by the
system over the total number of logs that it gets. The proposed system uses sets,
and each set must have at least k different users before being able to release an
anonymized log. A possible drawback to this approach is that some sets do not
reach k users and, therefore, the logs contained in this set do not end up leaving the
system. As we can see in Figure 4.9, this effect exists and it is directly proportional
to the depth of the category tree. This is consistent, since with more depth, more
categories are created and the minimum of k users on these categories is reached
more slowly. However, we see that as more queries enter the system, all categories
become filled with queries and the percentage of log output increases, tending to
a 100% rate for any depth of the tree.
Secondly, to measure the preservation of original user’s interest in anonymized
user’s profiles, we will measure the distance between them, using a metric known
as Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) [155].
We calculate the distance between the categories of queries assigned to the original
profile and the anonymized profile. As our classification of categories is stored in
a tree graph, this distance is defined as the minimum length of the path that
connects the categories assigned to the original and anonymized query. Once we
have calculated the distance between individual queries, we add all the distances
of that profile and, thus, we obtain the total distance between profiles.
Notice that if two queries are classified and anonymized with the same category,
there is no distance between the two queries and there is no utility loss. This
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Figure 4.9: Output queries vs. total queries (%). Some sets take a while to
fill. This effect is directly proportional to the depth of the category tree as more
sets need to get k different users.
happens to all the queries when the depth of the tree is set to 13. However,
other tree depths can lead to utility loss. For instance, in the example of Tables
4.2, 4.3, “piano” is classified as “Arts/Music” but the anonymizer is just using
“Arts”, since the value of ` is equal to 1. Queries classified as “Arts/Music” and
“Arts/Painting” are mixed in “Arts” and assigned to different users. A third party
could think that Alice is interested in “Painting”, when she is just interested in
“Music”. i.e., there is a certain degree of utility loss. Since the third party still
knows that Alice is interested in “Art”, we can see the previous case as an example
of partial utility loss. Therefore EMD represents the distance between the original
user’s interests, and the ones that are deducted from the anonymized queries.
In Figure 4.10, we can see the average value of the EMD distances, as well as the
maximum theoretical distance between profiles using the chosen categorization.
This theoretical maximum distance is constant, regardless of which ` and k values
we use. The real distance we get is not affected by k, but is inversely proportional
to `. This means that the more levels we use in our anonymizer, the closer the
anonymized queries get to their original category and we obtain a better data
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Figure 4.10: Maximum theoretical distance between profiles, constant, and
average EMD distances, inversely proportional to `.
Figure 4.11: Loss of utility (%), the more levels we use in our anonymizer,
the better data utility.
utility. In Figure 4.11, we can see the loss of utility expressed as a percentage.
Using this metric, it can be seen that with ` = 1, loss of utility is over 40% on
average. With ` = 6, the loss of utility is near to 0%, according to our definition
of utility.
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4.4.5 Functional Study
Next, we detail the accomplishment of proposed functional requirements.
4.4.5.1 Modularity
To allow a modular system, this has been designed as a set of micro-services.
As our proposal uses micro-service architecture, it will be easier to modify and
adapt when applied to different environments. In addition, this design helps each
service to focus only on a specific process. By doing so, we achieve a system with
low coupling and high cohesion. The anonymization service has been thoroughly
explained. This service can be connected to other modules such as categorization
and profile creation.
4.4.5.2 Scalability
The proposed system can be scaled, both vertically and horizontally. Vertical
scalability is achieved by varying the number of resources assigned to the system.
These resources can be added either in form of memory or CPU cycles. Horizontal
scalability can also be achieved by activating or deactivating different instances
in parallel. In addition, with the proposed anonymizer, the value of k could be
dynamically adjusted, which also allows to improve the scalability of the system
using it in a wider range of situations.
4.4.5.3 Speed
Speed of the anonymizer and deanonymizers was tested. All the results that are
shown correspond to the time required to completely treat a query using a single
thread of execution on a single core. All the proposed algorithms can be used in
parallel, achieving a better system throughput.
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The fastest execution was achieved with k = 3 and ` = 1, where on average a
query was processed in 18.99 µs. Therefore, the system can handle up to 52659
queries per second, on average.
Average processing time per query was 33.68 µs, or 29691 queries per second. It
includes executions with all the k and ` values we have tested. Compared to our
previous proposal where we obtained 22 µs per query, we see that the system is
slower on average, but with greater data utility. However, depending on which
parameter values are used, the system is faster than our previous proposal, as
described below.
Figure 4.12: Anonymizer mean time per query (µs). `-value has little effect
on required time, k-value has a greater effect.
Speed of the anonymizer is affected by k and `. If we look at Figure 4.12, we can
see that changes in the value of ` have little effect on required time. Contrarily,
changes in the value of k have an important effect. For example, for k = 3 the
system can process a log in about 18.99 µs. This value reaches 49.71 µs with a
a value of k = 190. Taking into account that Google treats an average of 40000
queries per second (cf. Ref. [156] and citations thereof), a thread of our algorithm
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could handle all real-time queries, using k-values up to 50 with any value of `,
according to our test results.
Figure 4.13: De-anonymizer 1 - Mean time per query (µs). First de-
anonymizer obtained comparable results to the anonymizer.
Figure 4.14: De-anonymizer 2 - Mean time per query (µs). Second de-
anonymizer, which is more complex, is also slower and more affected by increases
in k-value.
The same analysis has also been done with proposed de-anonymization algorithms.
Results can be seen in Figures 4.13 4.14 4.15. The first de-anonymizer approach
obtained results comparable to the anonymizer. This was expected since in both
cases the same base algorithm was used. Second and third de-anonymizers, which
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Figure 4.15: De-anonymizer 3 - Mean time per query (µs). Third de-
anonymizer, the most complex, is also the slowest, being more noticeable with
high k-values.
perform more complex operations, are also slower and more affected by increases
in k-values. In all cases, we see that variations of `-values are less important.
4.4.5.4 Delay
Another factor that we consider important to evaluate is the average delay of
queries between entering and leaving the system in form of anonymized query
logs. Figure 4.16 shows this delay as the mean number of other queries that enter
the system during the period between the entry and the release of a given query.
As we can see, this delay is increased proportionally to the chosen `-value, but it
ends up stabilizing. This is reasonable, since the system needs to fill categories
initially and once this happens, the output stabilizes.
Taking as reference the 40000 queries per second that Google receives (according
to Ref. [156]), we see that our system’s output stabilizes in a few minutes for larger
values of `. Once the delay is stable, our system takes less than one second for
values ` ≤ 6, and does not reach two seconds for larger values of `.
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Figure 4.16: Queries delay, as the mean number of other queries that enter
the system during the period between the entry and the leave of a given query.
Once the categories are full, the output stabilizes.
4.4.5.5 Resource Consumption
Notice that our algorithms do not use any disk space, therefore only memory
consumption needs to be evaluated.
We have identified the variations in `-value as the main parameter that affects
resource consumption. Memory consumption increases when a new level of depth
is added to the tree, in proportion to the number of effective categories that are
added (cf. Table 4.4). Categories were created dynamically, depending on query’s
classification, therefore a different data set will generate different categories. At
the end of our tests, we used a maximum of 194 505 categories, in a tree with
depth thirteen.
With our test data, we see that most records are classified at depths between
five and seven, although we found a maximum depth of thirteen. As we increase
depth, there are fewer queries that can be classified at the last levels, using the
same data and the same classifier. Although we increase the value of ` the effective
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` Added categories Total categories
1 16 16
2 537 553
3 5 523 6 076
4 21 786 27 862
5 36 806 64 668
6 35 543 100 211
7 39 998 140 209
8 26 914 167 123
9 16 863 183 986
10 7 863 191 849
11 2 143 193 992
12 441 194 433
13 72 194 505
Table 4.4: Number of categories added with each increase in `-value and total
categories of a tree with ` depth. Although we found a maximum depth of
thirteen, we see that most records are classified at depths between five and
seven.
number of categories created is marginally increased from this point. This also
causes memory consumption to stabilize. Let us illustrate the previous observation
with an example. Given a query classified as ”a:b:c:d:e” if we use an ` equal to 4,
the level 4 vertex ”a:b:c:d” is used for anonymization. If we increase ` to 5, or a
higher value, we use for anonymization the complete category, i.e. level 5 vertex
”a:b:c:d:e”, even if we use an ` = 13.
On the other hand, we can see that k adds a multiplicative factor in the consump-
tion of resources, depending on the number of existing effective categories. The
results in Figures 4.17, 4.18 and 4.19, only show the maximum memory consump-
tion.
Regarding different algorithms set forth, both anonymizer and de-anonymizer 1
show the same memory consumption profile. De-anonymizer 3 is the algorithm
with higher memory consumption. This is because that algorithm creates user
profiles in memory and therefore is reasonable that it uses more resources. Ano-
nymizer and de-anonymizers 1 and 2 should not use more memory than the
reported, regardless of the volume of logs they deal with. However, this is not
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the case of deanonymizer 3, as when it creates new user profiles, it increases the
memory consumption.
Figure 4.17: Anonymizer/De-anonymizer 1 - Memory consumption (GB). The
value of ` is the main parameter that affects memory consumption. The value
of k adds a multiplicative factor. Both the anonymizer and de-anonymizer 1
show the same memory profile.
Figure 4.18: De-anonymizer 2 - Memory consumption (GB). In this case, the
value of ` is also the main parameter that affects memory consumption, and the
value of k adds the same multiplicative factor.
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Figure 4.19: De-anonymizer 3 - Memory consumption (GB). The value of `
and k affect memory consumption in the same way. However, in this case we
have a higher memory consumption, because it creates user profiles in memory.
4.4.5.6 Efficiency
As we have seen in the previous sections, a lightweight method has been defined.
It allows the logs to be quickly processed with reduced resource consumption.
Studying the anonymizer we see that both delay and memory consumption vary
initially, because the system starts empty and the sets must be filled. As we have
seen, once the sets achieve k elements, these values stabilize. On the other hand,
the processing speed of a log depends on the value of k and `, but it remains
constant throughout each test set.
Analyzing the proposed algorithm, we can see that each log is only treated once.
This allows us to equate its efficiency with well known singly-linked list traversal
algorithms. Therefore, the algorithmic time complexity of our proposal is linear
regarding to the input and could be established as O(n).
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4.4.5.7 Transparency
The input of the system should be a stream of classified query logs that can be
obtained from the WSE. In case that only unclassified logs are available, a classi-
fication micro-service could be implemented and added to the WSE architecture,
as we previously showed in Chapter 3. In case that classified logs are available,
those logs could be used without further modifications. Our system generates an
anonymized stream of logs, preserving the existing structure. From the point of
view of an existing client, generated output will be completely indistinguishable
of the original one. Therefore, total transparency is reached.
4.5 Conclusion
A formal approach for the anonymization of WSE query logs has been presented.
Our proposal allows to publish query logs without any other modification than
eliminating direct identifiers and equivalent user re-assignment categories. This
contrasts with existing approaches that release heavily modified data, either dis-
torted or generalized, to maintain anonymity. In addition, our proposal allows
some degree of configuration, using two main parameters:
• k to adjust the level of diversity on each category.
• ` to adjust the amount of available categories.
This parameterization allows to adjust privacy and utility levels of generated logs
according to the needs of each application.
Three algorithms have been evaluated performing an attack to the anonymized
data, using the most favorable scenario for the attacker, i.e., when the attacker
knows the algorithms used by the WSE, all the parameters and the data. The
attacker has access to the anonymized log stream, but not to the original logs.
Tests with this context and several values of k and ` were conducted.
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Our best record-linkage attempt re-identified 23.18% of original logs with the low-
est k-value, highest `-value and using the most complex record-linkage algorithm,
which is also the one that needs more resources. With the same parameters, using
the simplest record-linkage algorithm we get an 18.36%. These results are reduced
rapidly, recovering less than 1% of original logs when using values of k over 100.
Variations in the values of ` do not have a representative impact in terms of record
linkage, but they do offer a significant improvement in terms of data utility.
Our proposed ideas were tested using the AOL released logs, showing the feasibil-
ity of our solution over real environments. The application of our work is sufficient
to generate anonymized logs that meet representative criteria, e.g., release of ano-
nymized data to third parties. Our solution can handle the equivalent to Google’s
average load, using only one execution thread in our testing environment. To eval-
uate log’s utility after anonymization, we have measured distances between user
profiles using Earth Mover’s Distance. We have found that using an `-value of
one, a 42.03% of utility was lost. Using `-values of six or more, less than 1% of
utility was lost.
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Chapter 5
Lifelogging Protection Scheme for
Internet-based Personal
Assistants
5.1 Introduction
Traditionally, people have used Web Search Engines, as the main gateway to the
Internet, but as time goes by, new proposals are trying to reduce the barriers to
access information even more.
In a broad sense, most of these new proposals are considered Smart Things [157],
a group which includes smartphones, smartgateways, smartwatches and activity
bands. A subset of Smart Things is getting a lot of attention in recent years. This
set of devices is known as Internet-based Personal Assistants, containing some
outstanding examples, such as Google Home and Amazon Echo [5, 44].
The traditional use of the WSEs is expected to be broaden when using Personal
Assistants, to aid domestic users in their household activities: shopping, travel
planning and home automation, among others. The remote participation of WSEs
and Social Network providers in the process, makes it already possible to process
113
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO LIFELOGGING PROTECTION IN STREAMING ENVIRONMENTS 
David Pàmies Estrems 
 
114 Lifelogging Protection Scheme for Internet-based Personal Assistants
vast amount of information to increase social experiences such as scheduling of
meetings and spontaneous gatherings with family members and friends [44].
It is often easy to forget that when we interact with some online services, our
usage data is stored on the Internet. Using Personal Assistants, since the user is
not in front of a computer, the situation is even more accentuated. Users tend
to establish more relaxed relationship with the device, sometimes without even
knowing if it is working or sending information to another site, and mostly seeing
it as a friend or an extension of its person.
The recording and processing of all this information, denoted as lifelogging, that
is a term used to describe recording our everyday lives. Current applications of
lifelogging are built around remembrance or searching for specific events from the
past. In [7], they propose to extend this to allow them to characterise and measure
the occurrence of everyday activities of the user and in so doing to gain insights into
the user’s everyday behaviour. Their methods are to capture everyday activities,
and to use an algorithm which indexes the occurrence of basic semantic concepts.
Then use data reduction techniques to automatically generate a profile of the user’s
everyday behaviour and activities. They conclude that the overall performance of
these techniques makes it usable for characterizing the lifestyle and behaviour of
subjects. Therefore, it is possible to generate a more enriched users’ profiles, using
all the data generated by these devices.
Related to Internet-based Personal Assistants’ architecture, novel privacy risks also
arise. In [4] current topics in Smart environments are discussed while describing
interconnection issues, security threats and suggesting a lightweight framework
for ensuring security, privacy and trustworthy lifelogging. Under the scope of the
presented framework, new issues and security threats were undercovered. Security
challenges appear due to the lack of suitable security mechanisms and protocols
in the Internet of Things because of the limited resources of smart objects.
To sum up, in this chapter, we address the issue of transforming raw user’s data
from lifelogging data streams generated by Internet-based Personal Devices like
Google Home and Amazon Echo. We study the relation of such devices with other
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data information actors in terms of EU data protection directives and propose a
protection solution via anonymity transformation. Our proposal takes into account
the role of the organizations and their needs to monetize generated data. Our
protection scheme aims at limiting the risk of privacy disclosure, while maintaining
an adequate level of data utility.
The remainder sections of the chapter are organized as follows. Section 5.2 intro-
duces our problem statement. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 present the general overview
and architecture of our proposal. Section 5.5 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Problem Statement
5.2.1 EU Data Protection Actors
EU Directive 95/46/EC [158], nowadays superseded by the new General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) [38], defines different roles that are relevant to
the protection of general-case lifelogging environments. First, it defines the Data
Controller as the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other
body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the
processing of personal data.
Lifelogging environments need to clearly identify who is the Data Controller, since
it determines which national law is applied. The data controller is the responsible
for determining what data must be processed, which third parties can access this
data and when this data must be deleted.
In addition, the figure of the Data Processor has the responsibility to ensure the
security in the processing of personal data. The directive states that it is the
natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body that processes
personal data on behalf of the controller. It is also necessary to determine the
Data Processor, as it also sets the national law to be applied. It is also necessary
to consider the Data Subject, as the person who is generating the data and from
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which we need the consent. The directive also requires to guaranteeing a set of
basic rights to the Data Subject, such as the right to access their information or
to oppose to the data processing.
Main
Service
3rd party
3rd party
3rd party
User A
User B
Personal 
Assistant
Figure 5.1: Main Architecture. Users represent the data subject, and are au-
thorized to interact with the Personal Assistant devices, by submitting queries
and commands. Personal Assistant devices then send those commands to the
Main Service that take the role of data collectors. Finally, the Third Parties are
the entities acting as data processors. They represent those parties that express
interest on legitimately accessing the anonymized query and command logs.
Figure 5.1 depicts a lifelogging environment which involves several actors, namely:
Users, Personal Assistant devices, remote Main Services and Third Parties. Users
represent the actors related to data subject, i.e., they represent the entities that are
authorized to interact with the Personal Assistant devices, by submitting queries
and commands. The Personal Assistant devices receive both queries and com-
mands from associated users. Queries and commands are sent and processed by
the Main Services for customized results. The remote Main Services take the role
of data collectors. They have direct access to the original queries and, e.g., com-
mand and control logs, sent by the Personal Assistant devices. Third Parties are
the entities acting as data processors. They represent those parties that express
interest on legitimately accessing the anonymized query and command logs, to
eventually process and use them.
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Table 5.1: General search query example
Request What’s the most populous country in the world
Response Ten Countries with the Highest Population in the World - Internet World
Stats
Time 25 Apr 2018, 13:34:37
Products Assistant
Locations 48.624924, 2.443970
Table 5.2: Location based query example
Request What’s the weather like tomorrow?
Response In Paris, tomorrow, there will be storms intermittently, with a maximum
temperature of 24 degrees and a minimum temperature of 13 degrees
Time 22 May 2018, 14:09:53
Products Assistant
Locations 48.624924, 2.443970
5.2.2 Data Structure
Personal Assistant devices may receive three different types of queries: (1) general
search queries, (2) location based queries and (3) commands. They are transferred
to the Main Servers for processing. Hence, the Main Service stores all the original
logs for each Personal Assistant device with respect to its different associated
Users. Queries and commands are defined as follows:
• General search queries — These are the traditional queries we are accus-
tomed to send to a Web search engine using, e.g., a computer or a mobile
phone. These queries help users to find what they are looking for, from
over 1.8 billion websites [159]. Users just have to ask a question and the
system returns the main result they are looking for. The query example 5.1
illustrates a general search query log, based on the Google-Home personal
assistant device.
• Location based queries — based on spatial and temporal data, location-
based queries are classified on two categories: elementary queries and deriva-
tive queries. Navigation and search for Point of Interests are typical elemen-
tary location based queries. Derivative queries are mainly processed for guid-
ing or tracking to provide customized results to users. The query example
5.2 presents an elementary location-based query log, based on Google-Home
personal assistant device.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO LIFELOGGING PROTECTION IN STREAMING ENVIRONMENTS 
David Pàmies Estrems 
 
118 Lifelogging Protection Scheme for Internet-based Personal Assistants
Table 5.3: Command example
Request Can you increase the sound to 20%
Response
Time 3 May 2018, 09:06:01
Products Assistant
Locations 48.624924, 2.443970
• Commands — They allow users to request direct actions that affect their
own environment. These actions are usually related to home automation,
multimedia control, alarms, lists, etc. Although these actions usually only
have a local repercussion, all the data they generate is also stored together
with the rest of the logs. The example 5.3 presents a command log, based
on Google-Home personal assistant device.
5.2.3 Security and Functional Requirements
The proposed scheme has to fulfill a series of security and functional require-
ments. First of all, and in terms of user privacy entities’ privacy can be pre-
served thanks to the query de-identification, using different approaches, namely
full de-identification, partial de-identification and statistical de-identification. It is
commonly agreed that statistical de-identification is the more suitable approach.
It is accomplished trough many statistical criteria and anonymization techniques,
being k-anonymity and its extension l-diversity the two most widely accepted
techniques. Those techniques were proposed for structured data [78, 79, 85, 86].
In terms of scalability, the system shall be capable of handling any increase of
workload. It shall be capable of accommodating any type of growth [149]. As an
additional requirement, the system shall guarantee that the resource consump-
tion is kept low, to facilitate its inclusion in existing architectures, minimizing
overhead cost. Even though the system is supposed to scale with added resources,
it is important not to increase unreasonably the current system’s resource con-
sumption.
In terms of data utility, and although full de-identification is desirable from a
privacy standpoint, organizations need to monetize some non-sensitive user infor-
mation, selling it to a third party. Also third parties want to extract some useful
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user characteristics from the data they bought. The main problem is that query
and command logs can also reveal sensitive information, raising some serious pri-
vacy concerns. So there is a trade-off between anonymizing logs and keeping them
useful to extract information through data mining processes. Therefore, the main
challenge related to data utility is to anonymize sensitive user data removing as
few information as possible in order to have enough interesting information to be
analyzed. To do so, the proposed scheme aims to build synthetic logs and user
profiles, which should maintain users’ interests and break quasi-identifiers that
could allow to identify an user. Queries should be anonymized to not relate sensi-
tive information to a user identity. It should be as difficult as possible to relocate
queries in order to build original user’s profile. In the end, the proposed system
should generate those fake logs and profiles with other users’ queries.
5.3 Proposal
In this section we will propose a preliminary implementation of a system to protect
users’ privacy, protecting logs generated from the use of virtual assistants. This
proposal wants to be a proof of concept to study the viability of this type of
solutions and promote its discussion.
Our ultimate goal is to allow the monetization of those logs by the organizations,
preserving the privacy of users. This will also allow these logs to be sold to third
parties, without disseminating sensitive user information.
As we have seen, working in a trusted environment may have some problems. In
our proposal we assume that we are in a semi-trusted environment, where all the
actors can be honest but curious.
To achieve a viable architecture in this environment, we need to add some actors
to the basic architecture of the system, as we can see in Figure 5.2.
The Identity Screener ensures the compliance with the legal constraints and re-
quirements to settle, e.g., privacy prevention algorithms, based on criteria set by
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3rd party
Personal
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Figure 5.2: Proposed architecture for semi-trusted environment, where all the
actors can be honest but curious. It contains a Identity Screener which acts
as a container of privacy algorithms, and an Auditor, responsible of auditing
accountability and users’ consent requirements.
EU regulation directives. Indeed, it acts as a container of privacy algorithms to
enforce data protection and control any misuse between the other parties. In the
following section, we describe more in depth the working properties of an idealized
Identity Screener conducting sanitizable signatures and log anonymization. The
Auditor is a dedicated entity which is responsible of auditing the Identity Screener
and Main Service activities with respect to accountability and users’ consent re-
quirements.
5.3.1 Sanitizable Signatures
The notion of sanitizable signatures was introduced in [160]. Sanitizable signatures
are malleable mathematical schemes, that allows an authorized semi-trusted party,
referred to as sanitizer, to modify designated portions of a signed message in a
limited and controlled fashion.
The sanitizer can modify parts of the original message m when the original en-
tity that created the message, referred to as the signer provides a description
of the admissible modifications, hereinafter denoted as Adm, for each message-
sanitizer pairs. That is, the signer divides the message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ into N blocks
m1, · · · ,mN , defines the set Adm ⊆ {1, N} of admissible blocks and signs the
whole message using a key related to the sanitizer. Using the aforementioned
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key, the sanitizer is able to modify the admissible parts of m in a way that keeps
the resulting signature still valid, under the public key of the signer. Therefore,
the sanitizer could produce a valid signature of the legitimately modified message
without interacting with the original signer.
There are several constructions for this primitive, based on standard signature
schemes, such as chameleon hashes, which are proved secure under common cryp-
tographic assumptions.
Sanitizable signatures can also be improved to satisfy unlinkability [161]. Unlink-
ability is a strong privacy property which forbids a third party from linking two
(or more) messages. In other words, it guarantees that is unfeasible to distinguish
between sanitized signatures that have been produced from the same message or
by the same sanitizer. It is also possible to limit the set of all possible modifica-
tions on one single block and how to enforce the same modifications on different
messages blocks [162].
The aforementioned properties, draw sanitizable signatures as specially interesting
for architectures where multiple actors interact, such as in the Personal Assistant
environment. The implemented scheme and experimental performance measure-
ments for the implementation of a sanitizable signature scheme, demonstrates that
the scheme could be practical and efficient for our application.
5.3.2 Probabilistic k-anonymity
Most approaches that want to anonymize data in real-time use k-anonymity and
try to minimize the time needed to process the data [87, 88]. A data-set that
has been k-anonymized, fulfills the property that each record is indistinguishable
from at least k − 1 other records, and therefore no user can be re-identified with
a probability greater than 1
k
, using only record linkage attacks. We believe that a
more appropriate approach may be based on probabilistic k-anonymity [91], which
relaxes the indistinguishability requirement of k-anonymity and only requires that
the probability of re-identification be the same as in k-anonymity. This approach
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may be suitable for Personal Assistant logs as it is adaptable to a streaming
environment. In addition this process is also very fast in one way, anonymization,
but difficult to undo. Probabilistic k-anonymity also allows to select desired user
privacy level modifying k parameter values. The other advantage of using this
approach is that anonymized logs are generated using real user queries, they are
not modified, but distributed among other users with similar interests. In this way
the quasi-identifiers get dispersed between several users and thus prevent record
linkage attacks, but data utility can be preserved as well (see Chapter 4).
5.4 System Overview
We propose the creation of a modular system, following the design that can be
seen in Figure 5.3. The system consists of five different parts. Within each of these
parts we divide the tasks into different modules. Each module will be responsible
of a single action in order to accomplish the Single Responsibility Principle, defined
as a micro-services architecture.
Our proposal is focused on the Request Architecture. To have the full system
operative, it is necessary to add more components to that architecture to handle
the responses, using the same concepts. Therefore, the proposed system begins
with the interaction of the User and the Personal Assistant, which will generate a
set of queries. These queries will be sent through the network for treatment. Once
treated, the resulting logs will be properly anonymized, increasing the privacy
protection of the user. That makes possible to sell these protected logs to third
parties to monetize them. Below we will briefly describe the functions performed
at each stage of the proposed system.
5.4.1 System Initialization
As a prior step to the start of system execution, we must ensure the distribution of
the key pairs to create and check the User Sanitizable Signatures and the Service
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USER_ID ENCRYPTED USS
USER_ID QUERY
PRIV_ID ENCRYPTED USS
Query
Anonymizer
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Query
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Command
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PRIV_ID QUERY
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Figure 5.3: Request Architecture. The User will interact with the Personal
Assistant, which will generate a set of queries. These queries will be sent through
the Identity Screener, which will hide the user identity. Then the Main Service
will treat and anonymize these queries. After passing through the Identity
Screener again, it is possible to safely sell these protected logs to Third Parties.
Sanitizable Signatures, as well as the certified public key of the Main Service to
all the Personal Assistants.
5.4.2 Query Pre-processing
The pre-processing steps are performed before the query reaches the Main Service.
These steps encrypt the query, and replace the original user ID with an anonymous
one.
5.4.2.1 Local Device
The user sends a question to the Local Device, that recognizes who has formulated
it and transforms it into text. Once transformed, our model proposes to encrypt
this query using the public key of the Main Service and then sign it using the User
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Sanitizable Signature. This signature will allow the Identity Screener to modify
the user’s part, but not the rest of the message.
5.4.2.2 ID Anonymizer
Then the query is sent to the Identity Screener, which is a distinct administrative
entity than the Main Service. Using the ID Anonymizer module, it is respon-
sible for replacing the original USER ID with an anonymous ID, which we call
PROX ID. The purpose of this change is to prevent the Main Service from know-
ing the real identity of the user that generated the original query. We want to
emphasize that Identity Screener do not have access to the original query, since in
this point is encrypted.
5.4.3 Anonymization
The anonymization process, which is conducted entirely in the Main Service, is
the responsible of anonymize and generalize the requests. All steps in this part,
are carried out without knowing the real identity of the users, thanks to the pre-
processing steps.
5.4.3.1 Request Decrypter
The first step that the Main Service does is to verify that the signature of the query
is correct. Then it discards that signature and proceeds to decrypt the body of
the query with the Main Service private key.
5.4.3.2 Request Classifier
As introduced in Section 5.2.2, our system will receive three different types of
logs. The main responsibility of the Request Classifier is to process all the logs,
to find the type of each log and to decide how it will be treated. Therefore, it acts
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as the facade or distributor part of the system. By itself it does not make any
modification to the data generated by the user.
5.4.3.3 Query Anonymizer
This module is the responsible for anonymizing general search queries. To do
this, we propose to use a system based on probabilistic k-anonymity (Chapter 4).
This system uses a natural language categorizer of logs in real time and for each
category creates two sets of k elements. In the first set, it stores the users and in
the second set the queries. When a category contains k elements, the algorithm
randomly picks one user and one query from each of the sets in the same category.
With them, it builds a new anonymized log, with a minimum delay. This system
obtains a level of protection similar to other methods using k-anonymity.
5.4.3.4 Query Generalizer
This module will be in charge of anonymizing the Location Based Queries. To
do this, we propose to use an approach similar to the following [163–165]. In
this case, the situation is quite different, since both the query, all the associated
information (location and time) and the response that the user receives, may
disclose something that affects directly the user’s privacy. The basis of the system
is also k-anonymity, but also some data perturbation system may be applied, for
location and time information. It is difficult to unleash the logs of that effect,
since the results with better utility are the ones that are directly related to the
users location and time. This raises new challenges when it comes to protecting
this information, without losing data utility. Therefore it would be desirable to be
able to configure this module with different levels of privacy/utility, depending on
when and where the query was generated, in order to protect the identity of the
user.
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5.4.3.5 Command Generalizer
We will use an algorithm similar to the one proposed in the previous section, to
be able to obtain anonymity on the user commands, as well as to anonymize both
the moment and the exact location of the user that issued them. We deal with
the commands in a different way, than with the queries, as we anticipate that we
will face different requirements when it comes to reducing the risk of information
disclosure in both scenarios.
5.4.3.6 Request Integrator
Once we have performed all the anonymization tasks in the previous modules, this
is the module in charge of unifying the results and then generating and publishing
the logs as the main system output. It also adds a Service Sanitizable Signature,
which will allow the Identity Screener to modify the user field, but not the rest.
5.4.4 Query Post-processing
The post-processing, in the current version, is only performing the ID De-
anonymizing step, which is mandatory for the proposed architecture. However,
further steps may be included in this part if required by third parties.
5.4.4.1 ID De-anonymizer
Once the Main Service has finished performing all of its tasks, the resulting logs
are resubmitted to the Identity Screener which, in turn, checks the Sanitizable
Signature Service and if it is correct then proceeds to restore the original USER ID,
through the ID De-anonymizer. We need to do this, since the third-party pays for
this relationship between the user and his interests. However, it should be noted
that now the text of the query is conveniently anonymized and therefore, despite
being able to extract the interests of users, they can not perform record linkage
attacks to obtain sensible information that threatens user privacy.
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5.4.5 Response
Below we will explain how the response is sent to the user. It is not the main focus
of our proposal, but we think that it is necessary in order to fully understand the
proposed architecture. An overview of the response architecture can be seen on
Figure 5.4.
5.4.5.1 Response Generator
Once the request has reached the Main Service, and passed through the Request
Decrypter, the Main Service has access to the user’s original query. Therefore it
can proceed to search for the necessary information and create the right answer
for the user, using Response Generator. Once this response has been created, the
same Response Generator will encrypt it and sign it with a Server Sanitizable
Signature.
USER_ID RESPONSE
PRIV_ID ENC. RESPO. SSS
Request
Classifier
Query
Anonymizer
Request
Decrypter
Query
Generalizer
Command
Generalizer
PRIV_ID QUERY
Auditor
Identity Screener
Main
Service
ID
Anonymizer
ID
De-anonym.
Filter
Auditor
Service
Auditor
Request
Integrator
Response
Generator
ENC. RESPO. SSSUSER_ID
Figure 5.4: Response Architecture. The Main Service creates and signs the
response for the User, using Response Generator. Then, it is submitted to
the Identity Screener, which restores the original USER ID, through ID De-
anonymizer, and send it to the Personal Assistant device, which decrypts and
provides the result to the user.
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5.4.5.2 ID De-anonymizer
Once the Main Service has finished performing all of its tasks, the resulting record
is resubmitted to the Identity Screener, that checks the Sanitizable Signature
Service. If this is correct, then the Identity Screener proceeds to restore the original
USER ID, through the ID De-anonymizer. However, it should be noted that the
response text is conveniently encrypted. Once this response reaches the Personal
Assistant device, it will be decrypted and provided to the user.
5.4.6 Audit
The auditing process is performed by a dedicated authority, mainly relying on the
verification process of Service Sanitizable Signature. That is, the auditor has to
verify the consistency of signed queries and responses, generated by the User, the
Identity Screener and the Main Service, such as:
• Identity Screener activities auditing — the auditor is able to verify
the consistency of signed queries, and responses, generated by the Iden-
tity Screener. In other words, honestly generated (i.e., signing correctness)
and sanitized (i.e., sanitizing correctness) signatures have to be accepted by
the verifier, and honestly generated proofs on valid signatures (proof cor-
rectness) have to be accepted by the judge algorithm of Service Sanitizable
Signature [160].
Recall that during the request process, the Identity Screener sanitizes the
user identifier using the PROX ID before sending the sanitized generated
query to Main Service. Consequently, a correspondence table should be
maintained by the Identity Screener, to be able to recover the USER ID,
when sanitizing the response query received later by the Main Service. In
addition, to comply with GDPR [38], with regard to accountability purposes,
the Proxy Filter has to store a proof for every personal data processing. That
is, for each USER ID, a set of signatures’ tuples associated with a session
identifier needs to be stored. Each tuple is represented as follows:
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{session identifier, signed query (PA), sanitized query (Identity Screener)}
Hence, the auditor may check both generated signatures, by the Personal
Assistant and the Identity Screener during the request process, and by the
Main Service and the Identity Screener, during the response process and also
compare consistency between the original signature and sanitized one.
• Main Service activities — similarly, the dedicated auditor verifies the
consistency of signed original queries’ responses and anonymized query logs,
generated by the Main Service.
Recall that the Main Service should store anonymized query logs and is
able to process personal data, only with the consent of the corresponding
data owner [38]. That is, when registering with Main Service, each user
generates an authorization vector av, specifying the allowed actions on his
data. For instance, for transfer actions, each user has to specify which data
processors (Third Party) are authorized to collect his data from the Main
Service. As detailed below, to comply with GDPR [38], with regard to user
consent compliance, Main Service has to store a proof for every personal data
processing. For instance, for each transfer process, a set of signatures’ tuples
associated with a session identifier needs to be stored. Each tuple includes
the transfer session identifier, the original signed query, the anonymized
signed query as well as the third party identifier. It is represented as follows:
{transfer session identifier, signed original query (MS), signed anonymized query
(MS), TP identifier}.
As each anonymized query has to be sent the Proxy Filter, in order to
sanitize the query identifier using the USER ID, before transmitting to Third
Parties. Hence, the auditor may check both generated signed and sanitized
signatures, by Main Service and the Identity Screener respectively and also
verify if transfer actions are allowed with regard to each user authorization
vector.
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5.5 Conclusion
Internet-based personal assistants can lead to serious privacy risks. They can
release sensitive information about the identity of domestic users and their sen-
sitive data. The issue must be tackled by jointly addressing anonymization by
organizational roles in terms of Data Controller, Data Processor and Data Sub-
ject. Towards this end, we have proposed an architecture that combines lifelogging
anonymization and sanitizable signatures, to promptly mitigate privacy threats.
We believe that the proposed architecture is very encouraging, in order to define
a system that allows us to work in a trusted-but-curious Internet-based Personal
Assistants environment. Anyway, we are aware that this approach has some limi-
tations in which we are still working. Regarding the part of communication with
the user, it must be ensured that the Personal Assistant does not send informa-
tion to the Main Service directly, therefore escaping the treatment of the Identity
Screener.
Regarding the communication with the Third Parties, we do not have this problem,
since if they want to recover the original USER ID, all messages must go through
the Identity Screener. In this case, the possible privacy problem would appear
if any of the third parties send the data back to the Main Service once it have
been processed by the Identity Screener. In this case, the Main Service, would
have access to the anonymized query and the original USER ID. Therefore, if the
Main Service has saved the correspondence between the original query and the
anonymized query, it could fetch the original query and user pair.
We are currently in a preliminary work stage of this system, with the limitations
that this implies, but we are trying to improve this aspect of our proposal.
Next steps include a more thorough analysis about the cooperation of the different
elements of our architecture, as well as to provide further investigation about the
effective techniques included in the architecture with a specific brand of Internet-
based personal assistants. Snippets of code, available at http://j.mp/lps-ipa,
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based on a cryptographic library [166], released to facilitate the understanding and
validation of the proposed architecture.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
In order to access the Internet people need to use search services, whether this be
in their classical Web Search Engine form or through personal assistants, which
provide a more transparent tool for accessing information. Interactions with these
services leaves a record of interests, personal and work information. For service
providers, these records are very valuable, since they provide a way to improve the
service, and a way to monetize it.
Monetization is achieved by selling data to third parties, but it is necessary to be
extremely careful in the process. Selling data may generate huge negative con-
sequences, since query logs may contain identifiers or sensitive data from users
(such as diseases, sexual tendencies, religious beliefs). Besides ethical considera-
tions, current regulations oblige companies to protect personal information.
In the literature review, protection systems for data-sets were found, most of
them working with perturbative approaches over atomic files. Unfortunately, the
scenario posed by Internet searches is closer to a real time stream of the user’s data.
Considering this scenario, we did not find an ideal solution for these requirements,
given that the data is intended to be consumed once protected, and therefore have
to maintain a high degree of utility.
133
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In this sense, a novel framework for anonymizing query logs has been presented.
Privacy guarantee is defined in terms of set theory, which relates sets of users
to sets of query logs. Data could be released without modifications other than
removing direct identifiers from query text and remapping between those two sets.
This contrasts with existing approaches that release heavily modified data, either
distorted or generalized, to maintain anonymity.
Regarding privacy, we have devised formal and experimental proofs to ensure
proposal’s comportment. In our evaluations we have considered the worst-case
scenario, in which an attacker who is willing to use the anonymized query logs to
retrieve the original ones has gained access to the base information of the service:
algorithms, anonymized logs, k and ` values.
Our first proposal is fast and with a high level of privacy. However, since the
number of categories it uses is low, the utility of the anonymized data could be
improved. This led us to our second proposal. In this case, the proposal allows one
to adjust the amount of available categories, as well as the number of elements in
each category. This parameterization permits different privacy and utility levels,
according to the needs of each application.
In order to evaluate query log’s utility after applying anonymization, we have
measured distances between user profiles using Earth Mover’s Distance and also
manually classified and compared a sample of logs. To achieve comparable results
between our first and second proposal, we used the second one with an `-value of 1,
which draws them equivalents in terms of anonymization. Studying the results we
have found that just above 40% of utility was lost in both cases. However, utility
increases rapidly with bigger `-values in our second proposal. With `-values of 6 or
more, less than 1% of utility was lost, without affecting privacy, since we achieve a
protection of 1
k
in all cases. Therefore, the application of our proposal is sufficient
to generate anonymized logs that meet the defined utility criteria and could be
released to third parties safely.
Algorithmic time complexity of our proposal is linear regarding to the input and
could be established as O(n). We have also considered the average Google’s load,
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in queries per second, to study the run-time cost and the memory usage. The
results show that proposed anonymizer algorithms could handle the equivalent to
the average of Google’s load in real-time, using only one thread of execution and
a feasible amount of memory, in our test environment.
A full architecture, taking into account the use of Internet-based Personal Assis-
tants, was finally presented. This architecture, jointly addresses anonymization by
organizational roles in terms of Data Controller, Data Processor and Data Subject,
in order to comply with the guidelines of the GDPR. Arriving at the final pro-
posal of an architecture that combines lifelogging anonymization and sanitizable
signatures, to promptly mitigate privacy threats.
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6.2 Future Work
The proposed architecture is very encouraging in defining a system that allows us
to work in trusted-but-curious Internet-based environments. We are aware that
this approach has some limitations, but there are some parts that may be further
expanded on and become future work lines.
All the proposals that have been presented need to use classified queries in order to
later protect them. In our case, we used a custom classifier, which was not the main
subject of our research. The proposed classifier algorithms could be the subject of
further study. The classifier may be improved by means of a more accurate natural
language analysis in order to perform a semantic analysis of queries. However, the
classifier was also the slowest part of the process and a more sophisticated one
may need more processing power. Anyway, there is room to develop more efficient
alternatives using NLP or Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems to perform query
analysis.
AI by means of the subfields of machine learning (ML) and search, provides some
techniques that can be used to deanonymize transformed datasets. Impact on ano-
nymity can get higher when data combines merged information from heterogeneous
nature, data sources coming from third parties which, although not malicious, may
have different objectives from those of a defender (e.g. sharing anonymized or
truncated data that becomes unusable or even harmful). This concerns the pro-
tection against attacks on the learning phase, which we consider as an interesting
complementary line of research.
In order to properly control the risk, attacks on the test phase must also be
addressed. Regarding this last point, the problem can be summarized by the
fact that a very precise classifier will have difficulty generalizing his decisions and
conversely a classifier able to handle data relatively different from those on which
he has been trained will tend to be quite imprecise. Overly precise algorithms
will be difficult to generalize but will also be more sensitive to attacks resulting in
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poor classification on slightly noisy data [167]. Conversely, an algorithm that is
sensitive to detail will tend to let malicious content flow more easily.
We propose to integrate this kind of compromise into the security game modeling
risk management. An interesting avenue would be to consider the possibility for
a classifier not to produce an answer. This behavior corresponds to the rejection
principle, which is relatively well known in the classification community, but to
our knowledge, is poorly understood in the context of application to security [168].
Regarding the anonymizer, our best proposal is able to work with custom degrees
of classification. However, the degree, once selected, becomes fixed. It would be
interesting to expand the anonymizer to use dynamic degrees of classification, both
globally or for some specific categories.
Although the proposed architectures use a micro-service approach, a distributed
environment remains untested. A more thorough analysis of the cooperation of
the different elements would be beneficial. This could improve the system per-
formance, but other concerns may arise in terms of management, security, and
privacy.
When we take into account the use of Personal Assistant devices, as the main
communication interface with the user, it must be ensured that these devices
act honestly. In fact, they should not have the opportunity to send information
directly to the Main Service, therefore escaping the treatment of the proposed
Identity Screener, however, this could be addressed by a simple address control at
the local router.
Regarding the communication with Third Parties, we do not have this problem,
since if they want to recover the original USER ID, all messages must go through
the Identity Screener. The possible privacy problem would appear if any of the
third parties send the data back to the Main Service once it has been processed
by the Identity Screener. In this case, the Main Service would have access to the
anonymized query and the original USER ID. Therefore, if the Main Service has
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saved the correspondence between the original query and the anonymized query,
it could fetch the original query and user pair.
Finally, a large scale investigation with a specific search engine and a brand of
Internet-based personal assistants would provide a full validation of the proposal.
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